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ABSTRACT 
 
Are Tax and Non-Tax Factors Associated with FIN 48 Disclosures? (August 2010) 
Janet Lee McDonald, B.S., Auburn University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Michael R. Kinney 
 
This study examines the determinants of tax aggressiveness.  I utilize the 
unrecognized tax benefits (UTB) disclosed by the adoption of Financial Interpretation 
No. 48, “Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes” (FIN 48) to proxy for firms’ tax 
aggressiveness.  I hand collect UTB disclosures for 562 calendar year-end firms in the 
S&P 1500.  Controlling for firms’ incentives and abilities to engage in aggressive tax 
positions (tax factors) and firms’ discretion over recognizing the financial reporting 
benefits of aggressive tax positions, I examine whether firms’ level of aggressive tax 
positions is influenced by (1) financial reporting aggressiveness, (2) choice of auditor, 
(3) analyst coverage, and (4) corporate governance quality.   
Using ordinary least squares regression, I examine the determinants of firms total 
UTB and its permanent and temporary components.  I find that UTB and its permanent 
component are positively associated with firm size, presence of foreign operations, 
research and development activity, selling, general and administrative activity, firm 
value, and the probability that the firm engages in tax shelter activity.  However, the 
temporary component is only increasing in firm size.  Also, I find that UTB and its 
permanent component are positively associated with firms engaging in financial 
 iv 
reporting aggressiveness and increasing auditor provided tax services, but negatively 
associated with analyst coverage, while the temporary component is only positively 
associated with financial reporting aggressiveness.   
Finally, I split the sample based on firms’ use of discretion over recognizing the 
tax benefits of aggressive tax positions prior to FIN 48 adoption.  I find that firms which 
aggressively recognize tax benefits prior to FIN 48 adoption (i.e. firms that increased 
UTBs at FIN 48 adoption) have UTBs that are positive and significantly associated with 
(1) the probability that a firm engages in tax shelter activity, (2) auditor provided tax 
services, and (3) their record of using last chance earnings management to meet or beat 
analyst forecasts. These associations are not significant for firms that did not 
aggressively recognize tax benefits prior to FIN 48 adoption, suggesting that firms’ 
financial reporting aggressiveness is positively associated with firms’ level of tax 
aggression.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In their survey of empirical tax research, Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) suggest 
the need for research investigating the determinants of tax aggressiveness.  Extant 
literature suggests that tax aggressiveness is associated with tax factors, and with non-tax 
factors, such as financial reporting aggressiveness (Frank et al. 2009; Lisowsky 2008).  
However, lack of disclosure on aggressive tax positions has hindered researchers from 
directly examining this relationship.  Using adoption disclosures under Financial 
Interpretation No. 48, “Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes” (FIN 48), I 
investigate whether firms’ level of aggressive tax positions is influenced by (1) financial 
reporting aggressiveness, (2) choice of auditor, (3) analyst coverage, and (4) corporate 
governance quality, controlling for firms’ incentives and abilities to engage in aggressive 
tax positions and firms’ discretion over recognizing the financial reporting benefits of 
aggressive tax positions.  Consistent with Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), I define tax 
avoidance as a continuum of tax positions in which non-aggressive tax positions (e.g., 
municipal bond investments), are at one end and aggressive tax positions (like tax 
shelters) are at the other end (page 79).1  Consequently, tax avoidance includes all tax 
positions taken by the firm to reduce or defer tax expense.2
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of The Accounting Review.  
   Furthermore, I define an 
1 FIN 48 (2006) defines the term tax position as “a position in a previously filed tax return or a position 
expected to be taken in a future tax return that is reflected in measuring current or deferred income taxes 
and liabilities for interim or annual periods” (page 1).  
2 Although not examined in this paper, tax positions can be classified as non tax avoidance.  Non tax 
avoidance positions are defined as tax positions taken by the firm to increase or accelerate tax expense.  
Such positions could be temporary or permanent, non-aggressive or aggressive.  No matter the non tax 
 2 
aggressive tax position (or uncertain tax position) as a tax position taken by the firm that 
may not pass scrutiny of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).3
In June 2006, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued FIN 48 
to harmonize accounting practices and to respond to the SEC’s concern about lack of 
consistency in treatment of tax uncertainties.  FIN 48 uses a two-step process 
(recognition and measurement) to promote comparability in accounting for benefits of 
aggressive tax positions.  FIN 48 also requires firms to provide detailed disclosures of 
the tax reserve for unrecognized tax benefits.  For most firms, the FIN 48 adoption 
disclosure is the first disclosure of aggressive tax positions (Zion and Varshney 2007; 
Blouin and Tuna 2007).   The FIN 48 adoption disclosure creates two manager-assessed 
measures of aggressive tax positions: (1) the total amount reserved for unrecognized tax 
benefits (UTB), which includes both permanent and temporary aggressive tax positions, 
and (2) the amount reserved for permanent, unrecognized tax benefits (PermUTB), 
which is the amount of UTB that, if recognized, would influence the effective tax rate.  
Frischmann et al. (2008) state that “UTBs provide an excellent measure of a firm’s tax 
aggressiveness because they represent management’s beliefs about the tax positions 
most likely to be challenged” (page 263).   
   
                                                                                                                                                
avoidance positions classification, they do not reduce taxes payable; consequently, they do not create “tax 
benefits.”  Moreover, firms do not record a tax reserve for such positions. 
3 Aggressive tax positions that reduce taxes payable on tax returns generate “tax benefits.”  In the financial 
statements, these tax benefits are treated as either “recognized” or “unrecognized.”  Tax benefits of newly 
implemented aggressive tax positions are recognized in the financial statements when they reduce current 
tax expense.  When firms record a contingent liability for uncertain tax positions, recognition of the tax 
benefits is deferred.  Tax practitioners customarily refer to the contingent liability for unrecognized tax 
benefits as the tax contingency, tax cushion, or tax reserve.  
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Prior to FIN 48 implementation, aggressive tax positions were both meagerly and 
inconsistently disclosed (Gleason and Mills 2002, 2007; Lisowsky 2008).  Most 
companies used Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 5, Accounting for 
Contingencies, as the authoritative guidance for reporting aggressive tax benefits, 
because SFAS 109, Accounting for Income Taxes, proffers no guidance for accounting 
for uncertainty about income tax assets and liabilities (FIN 48, Summary).  SFAS 5 
allowed firms discretion in disclosing the amount of tax reserve, and most firms 
provided little if any disclosure of their tax contingencies (Gleason and Mills 2002).  
SFAS 109 also does not require financial statement disclosure of proprietary details of 
tax positions taken by firms.  Consequently, financial statement users are unable to 
distinguish firms with aggressive tax positions from those with non-aggressive tax 
positions.  Because of this lack of disclosure, tax researchers have devised many 
measures to proxy for firms’ tax avoidance, but have been unable to operationalize the 
concept of tax aggressiveness.  
I hand collect the unrecognized tax benefit data from FIN 48 adoption 
disclosures in 2007 first quarter financial reports for a sample of 564 calendar year-end 
firms in the Standard and Poors (S&P) Composite 1500; I use the FIN 48 unrecognized 
tax benefit data to proxy for degree of aggression of firms’ tax positions.  I model firms’ 
unrecognized tax benefits and their permanent and temporary components as a function 
of firms’ (1) financial reporting aggressiveness, (2) choice of auditor, (3) analyst 
coverage, and (4) corporate governance, controlling for firms’ incentives and abilities to 
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engage in aggressive tax positions and firms’ discretion over recognizing the 
unrecognized tax benefits.    
First, I examine whether my control variables for firms’ incentives and abilities 
to engage in aggressive tax positions are also associated with firms’ level of aggressive 
tax positions.  Specifically, I examine whether  firms’ unrecognized tax benefits and 
their permanent and temporary components are related to firm size (Gupta and Newberry 
1997; Wilson 2009), profitability (Frank et al. 2009; Gupta and Newberry 1997), 
leverage (Graham and Tucker 2006), presence of foreign operations (Rego 2003; Wilson 
2009; Lisowsky 2008), research and development activity (Dyreng et al. 2008; Wilson 
2009), investments in tax planning (Song and Tucker 2008; Dyreng et al. 2008; Cazier et 
al. 2009), firm value (Song and Tucker 2008), and growth opportunities (Dyreng et al. 
2008; Song and Tucker 2008).  Results suggest that firms’ UTBs are positively 
associated with firm size, presence of foreign operations, research and development 
activity, selling, general and administrative activity, firm value, and the probability that 
the firm engages in tax shelter activity.  Determinants of permanent unrecognized tax 
benefits (PermUTB) are largely consistent with those of UTB. However, determinants of 
temporary unrecognized tax benefits (TempUTB) differ greatly from those of UTB.  
TempUTB is only increasing in firm size. 
Next I examine how firms’ financial reporting aggressiveness is related to firms’ 
level of aggressive tax positions.  The extant literature suggests that the degree of 
aggressiveness in firms’ tax strategies may be influenced by their financial reporting 
aggressiveness (Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Frank et al. 2009; Lisowsky 2008).  Using 
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confidential IRS data, Lisowsky (2008) finds that the tax cushion is positively related to 
use of tax shelters and earnings management, suggesting that the tax cushion may be 
subject to both tax and financial reporting effects.  Frank et al. (2009) find evidence that 
firms that are aggressive financial reporters are also tax avoiders.  Following the extant 
literature, I posit that firms’ degree of financial reporting aggressiveness is positively 
related to firms’ level of aggressive tax positions.  I use four proxies for financial 
reporting aggressiveness: (1) performance adjusted, modified Jones discretionary 
accruals, (2) firms’ five-year record of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts, (3) firms’ 
five-year record of using last chance earnings management to meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts, and (4) book effective tax rate (book ETR).  I find that unrecognized tax 
benefits (UTB) and its permanent (PermUTB) and temporary (TempUTB) components 
are significantly and positively associated with firms’ five-year record of using last 
chance earnings management to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.  TempUTB is also 
positively associated with firms’ five-year book effective tax rate.   
Then, I investigate whether firms’ choice of auditor influences the degree of 
firms’ tax aggressiveness.  To proxy for auditor quality, I employ a categorical variable 
indicating that the auditor is an industry specialist.  McGuire et al. (2010) state that the 
ex ante relationship between auditor quality and tax avoidance activities is unclear.  
Auditor quality is negatively related to firms’ level of aggressive tax positions if higher 
quality auditors constrain firms’ ability to recognize tax benefits to the point of 
eliminating firms’ incentives for taking aggressive tax positions.  Auditor quality is 
positively related to firms’ level of aggressive tax positions if the auditor’s expertise 
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associated with tax avoidance strategies leads firms to take aggressive tax positions that 
have stronger facts.  Consequently, I am unable to predict, ex ante, the direction of the 
association between auditor quality and firms’ level of aggressive tax positions.  I find 
that hiring an industry specialist auditor is not significantly related to unrecognized tax 
benefits (UTB) or its components. 
I also investigate if auditor provided tax services influence the degree of firms’ 
tax aggressiveness.  I utilize a ratio of the tax fees paid to the auditor over total fees paid 
to the auditor (tax fee ratio) to proxy for auditor provided tax services.  Prior literature 
suggests that firms’ tax avoidance behavior is positively correlated with fees paid to the 
auditors for tax services (Mills et al. 1998; Cook et al. 2008).  As the tax fee ratio 
increases, the audit firm is likely providing the client with more tax avoidance strategies, 
including aggressive tax positions.  Consequently, I expect a positive association 
between auditor provided tax services and firms’ level of aggressive tax positions.  I find 
a significantly and positive relation between auditor provided tax services and both 
unrecognized tax benefits (UTB) and its permanent (PermUTB) component, but not 
temporary unrecognized tax benefits.     
 The number of analysts covering a firm may also influence firms’ level of 
aggressive tax positions.  Yu (2008) finds that firms engage in less earnings management 
as the number of analysts following the firm increases.  Increased external monitoring 
may constrain the financial reporting benefits of aggressive tax positions; consequently, 
firms with greater analyst following may have less incentive to take aggressive tax 
positions.  Frank et al. (2009) find a negative relationship between measures of tax 
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aggressiveness and the number of analysts tracking a firm.  I posit that the number of 
analysts following a firm is negatively related to the firm’s level of aggressive tax 
positions.  I find that UTBs and the permanent UTBs (PermUTB) are negatively related 
to the number of analysts’ covering a firm; however, temporary UTB (TempUTB) is not 
related to analyst coverage.       
Then, I examine whether corporate governance influences firms’ tax 
aggressiveness.  The ex ante relationship between corporate governance quality and 
firms’ level of aggressive tax positions is unclear.  The extant literature has documented 
that stronger corporate governance is negatively associated with incidents of financial 
fraud and earnings manipulation (Klein 2002; Ahmed et al. 2008).  Corporate 
governance quality is negatively related to firms’ level of aggressive tax positions if 
stronger corporate governance constrains firms’ abilities to recognize tax benefits to the 
point of eliminating firms’ incentives for taking aggressive tax positions.  However, 
extant literature also suggests that strong corporate governance is positively related to 
corporate risk taking (Hill and Snell 1988; Hansen and Hill 1991; Wright et al. 1996).  
Consequently, I am unable to predict, ex ante, the direction of the association between 
corporate governance quality and firms’ level of aggressive tax positions.  I employ 
three proxies for corporate governance quality: (1) board independence, (2) institutional 
ownership, and (3) a categorical variable indicating strong shareholders’ rights, based on 
Gompers et al. (2003) index (G-index).  I find that strong shareholders’ rights are 
positively related to firms’ UTBs, but the association is only marginally significant.  
 8 
Finally, I split my sample based on firms’ use of discretion over the financial 
reporting benefits of aggressive tax positions prior to FIN 48.  I find firms that 
aggressively recognized tax benefits prior to FIN 48 adoption (i.e. firms that increased 
UTBs at FIN 48 adoption) have UTBs that are positive and significantly associated with 
the probability that a firm engages in tax shelter activity, auditor provided tax services, 
and firms’ record of using last chance earnings management to meet or beat analyst 
forecasts; whereas these associations are not significant for firms that did not 
aggressively recognize tax benefits prior to FIN 48 adoption.  This suggests that firms’ 
financial reporting aggressiveness is positively associated with firms’ level of tax 
aggression.   
This study makes several contributions.  First I extend the tax avoidance 
literature by using a measure that specifically measures firms’ tax aggressiveness.  Prior 
measures of tax avoidance capture a variety of tax positions that range from positions 
that are completely non-aggressive (e.g., investments in municipal bonds) to those of 
questionable legality (e.g., tax shelters).  However, those measures are unable to 
determine the extent to which firms engage in tax positions with uncertain outcomes.  In 
contrast, my measure captures managers’ “best guess” of outcomes of aggressive tax 
positions taken by the firm.   
Second I extend the emerging FIN 48 literature that investigates determinants of 
firms’ level of aggressive tax positions. My large hand-collected sample is gathered from 
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the S&P 1500.4
Third, I contribute to the literature examining the relationship between firms’ 
financial reporting aggressiveness and tax aggressiveness.  My study is the first to 
document a strong, positive relationship between financial reporting aggressiveness and 
tax aggression.  By focusing on the uncertainty of the tax position and by including both 
the permanent and temporary uncertain tax positions, the tax aggression measures 
employed in this study are a refinement over the tax avoidance measure introduced by 
Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009).       
  Distinct from other FIN 48 studies, I include large-, mid-, and small-cap 
firms, which increases the generalizability of results.  In addition to examining how 
unrecognized tax benefits are influenced by firms’ tax-related objectives (Song and 
Tucker 2008; Cazier et al. 2009),  I also examine a wide variety of non-tax factors that 
prior research suggests could influence firms’ tax-related decisions (Frank et al. 2009; 
Lisowsky 2008).  Consistent with this notion, my results suggest that financial reporting 
pressures, choice of auditor, and analyst coverage are each significantly associated with 
aggressive tax positions.       
Fourth, I extend the literature investigating the influence of analyst coverage and 
corporate governance on tax aggressiveness. I am the first to document the negative 
association between greater analyst coverage and level of permanent aggressive tax 
positions.  This result suggests that external monitors focus only on the aggressive tax 
                                                 
4 To cover approximately 90% of the US market capitalization, the S&P 1500 index conjoins 500 large-
cap, 400 mid-cap, and 600 small-cap firms from the S&P 500 index, the S&P MidCap 400 index, and the 
S&P SmallCap 600 index, respectively. 
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positions that affect earnings, as opposed to aggressive tax positions that do not affect 
earnings.   
The balance of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter II provides a literature 
review and background on FIN 48.  Chapter III develops hypotheses; Chapter IV 
introduces methodology, describes the sample selection, and presents the descriptive 
statistics and empirical results.  Chapter V concludes.    
 11 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH 
Evolution of Tax Avoidance Measures 
Prior to FIN 48 implementation, most companies used SFAS 5, Accounting for 
Contingencies, as the authoritative guidance for unrecognized tax benefits.  Corporations 
and their auditors utilized multifarious accounting methods to recognize and estimate tax 
reserves (Blouin et al. 2010).  Because tax reserves were both scantily and inconsistently 
disclosed (Gleason and Mills 2002, 2007; Lisowsky 2008), financial statement users and 
researchers were unable to discern the risk associated with firms’ tax positions; i.e., 
researchers could not distinguish between non-aggressive and aggressive tax positions.   
The extant literature is replete with tax avoidance measures: traditional book 
ETR, cash effective tax rate (cash ETR), and variations of book-tax differences.  Figure 
1 depicts the evolution of tax avoidance measures.  The sophistication of tax avoidance 
measures increased when tax researchers divided tax positions into their permanent and 
temporary components. However, none of the extant proxies are able to discern the 
riskiness (degree of uncertainty) associated with tax positions.  Despite the extensive 
research on tax avoidance, the literature has been unable to reach a consensus on 
terminology and measures of tax aggressiveness.   
When describing their measure of long-run corporate tax avoidance, Dyreng et 
al. (2008) avoid using the term “tax aggressiveness” because the term might imply 
wrongdoing by the firm.  The authors define tax avoidance as anything that reduces the 
firm’s cash ETR over a long horizon.  They measure cash ETR as the ratio of all cash 
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taxes paid (domestic, foreign, state, and local) to worldwide pretax book income, 
accumulated over a five- or ten-year period.  Dyreng et al. (2008) suggest several 
reasons why cash ETR offers major advantages over the traditional book ETR, 
specifically that it is a long-term measure rather than a single year, it includes the tax 
benefits of stock options, and it is not affected by changes in estimates such as the 
valuation allowance or tax contingency.  Cash ETR captures a variety of tax avoidance 
strategies, which include both non-aggressive (non-risky) tax positions and aggressive 
(risky) tax positions.   
Many studies suggest that book-tax differences can proxy for tax avoidance 
effects (Mills 1998; Desai 2003; Wilson 2009; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).  The book-
tax differences (BTD) measure is typically computed as pre-tax book income, less 
minority interest and an estimate of taxable income.  However, not all BTDs are 
reflective of aggressive tax behavior.  Hanlon (2003) and Manzon and Plesko (2002) 
show that some determinants of BTDs are not necessarily reflective of tax 
aggressiveness.  Tax researchers have split the BTDs measure into its components: 
temporary BTDs (Phillips et al. 2003; Hanlon 2005) and permanent BTD (Frank et al. 
2009; Wilson 2009) in an attempt to parse the informational content of the total BTD.5
                                                 
5 The permanent book tax difference measure developed by Frank et al. (2009) is called DTAX.   
  
However, these attempts to refine the BTD measures fail to differentiate the non-
aggressive (non-risky or certain) tax positions from the aggressive (risky or uncertain) 
tax positions.   
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Pre-FIN 48 Tax Reserve Literature  
The previous tax avoidance measures are intended to capture the effects of firms’ 
aggressive tax positions, but are incapable of differentiating between non-aggressive 
(non-risky or certain) tax positions and the aggressive (risky or uncertain) tax positions.  
The tax contingency/tax cushion/tax reserve would be an ideal measure of aggressive tax 
positions; however, under SFAS 5, Contingent Liabilities, firms were not required to 
disclose the amount of the tax contingency or tax cushion (Zion and Varshney 2007) and 
prior to the adoption of FIN 48, most firms did not voluntarily provide details of their tax 
reserves in their financial statements (Gleason and Mills 2002; Blouin and Tuna 2007).  
Consequently, the pre-FIN 48 tax reserve literature is limited.   
Gleason and Mills (2002) utilize confidential IRS audit data and financial 
footnotes to estimate firms’ contingent tax liabilities.  They estimate the tax cushion as 
the accumulated difference between U.S. current income tax expense reported in the 
financial statements and total tax on the income tax return for all years with unresolved 
tax claims.  Following Hanlon and Shevlin (2002), Gleason and Mills (2007) modify 
their previous measure of tax cushion for the tax benefits of employee stock options.  
They find that firms using auditor-provided tax services record a higher tax reserve prior 
to IRS examination.  Access to confidential IRS data allows Lisowsky (2008) to employ 
the same tax cushion calculation used by Gleason and Mills (2007).  Lisowsky finds the 
tax cushion to be positively related to use of tax shelters and earnings management, 
suggesting that the tax cushion may be subject to both tax and financial reporting 
pressures.   
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Accounting researchers interested in studying tax cushion issues, but lacking 
access to confidential IRS data, developed alternate ways of examining firms’ tax 
cushions.  Gupta and Laux (2008) hand collect reported reversals of the tax cushion for a 
random sample of 100 Fortune 500 companies for years 2003 through 2005.  They find 
that firms appear to opportunistically use tax cushion reversals to meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks.  
Blouin and Tuna (2007) construct a proxy for change in tax cushion by using 
available financial information.  Their proxy for tax cushion is the net change in firms’ 
contingent liability amount, calculated by taking current tax expense less cash taxes paid 
less any tax benefit from employee stock options and any change in income taxes 
payable.  They find that the change in contingent liability is negatively associated with 
cash taxes paid and book tax differences, but positively associated with U.S. effective 
tax rate and cumulative deferred tax expense.   
FIN 48 Provided Measures of Level of Aggressive Tax Positions 
FIN 48 requires firms to disclose their tax contingency reserve, which FIN 48 
renames as the “unrecognized tax benefit” or UTB.  FIN 48 uses a two-step process 
(recognition and measurement) to promote comparability in accounting for benefits of 
aggressive tax positions.  In the first step, the firm determines if any benefit of the 
aggressive tax position can be recognized in the financial statements.  To be recognized, 
the tax position must satisfy the recognition threshold of “more likely than not” (MLTN) 
being sustained upon a tax audit, based only on technical merits.  If the aggressive tax 
position does not meet the recognition threshold, the firm must book a tax reserve, an 
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unrecognized tax benefit (UTB), for the entire aggressive tax position.  In the second 
step, the firm measures the amount of the tax benefit that can be recognized in the 
financial statements if the aggressive tax position initially clears the MLTN hurdle.  The 
tax benefit recognized equals the largest amount of tax benefit that is cumulatively 
greater than 50 percent likely of being realized upon settlement.  The tax reserve 
increases by the difference of the tax position taken on the tax return and the tax benefit 
recognized in the financial statements.  FIN 48 also renames that tax reserve the 
“unrecognized tax benefit” or UTB.   
FIN 48 applies to all entities issuing GAAP financial statements and is effective 
for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2006.  Calendar year-end firms adopt FIN 
48 on January 1, 2007 and report the FIN 48 adoption effect in their first quarter 2007 
Form 10-Q.  FIN 48, paragraph 23, requires firms to report the cumulative effect of 
applying FIN 48 as an adjustment to beginning retained earnings and to disclose the 
following amounts as of the date of adoption: (1) the total amount of UTBs, (2) the total 
amount of UTBs that, if recognized, would affect the effective tax rate, (3) the total 
amount of accrued interest and penalties, (4) the treatment of interest and penalties, (5) 
UTBs that may significantly change within the next 12 months, and (6) information 
regarding open tax years by major jurisdictions.6
The UTB represents a firm’s potential future obligation to the taxing authority 
for a tax position that was not recognized (Zion and Varshney 2007).  Cazier et al. 
(2009) state, “if firms follow the two step process outlined in FIN 48, then unrecognized 
   
                                                 
6 Both Blouin et al. (2007) and Dunbar et al. (2010) suggest that reported UTB is understated because 
interest and penalties may not be included.   
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tax benefits should reflect aggressive tax [positions] in which the firm engages” (page 
11).  The unrecognized tax benefits disclosed at FIN 48 adoption are superior measures 
of tax reserve and level of aggressive tax positions for several reasons.  First, the 
unrecognized tax benefits unveiled at FIN 48 adoption are the first mandated manager-
provided, publicly available estimate of aggressive tax positions taken by the firm.  
Second, tax cushions calculated using confidential IRS data reveal only uncertainty 
regarding U.S. tax positions (Gleason and Mills 2007; Lisowsky 2008); unrecognized 
tax benefits encompass firms’ aggressive tax positions globally.  Third, the UTB 
includes both permanent and temporary aggressive tax positions whereas the PermUTB 
includes only the permanent aggressive tax positions taken by the firm.7
                                                 
7 An example of a permanent uncertain tax position is a tax position contingent on whether a firm has 
nexus in a particular state.  An example of a temporary uncertain tax positions is a tax position contingent 
on whether a firm correctly deducts self-constructed assets.  
  Disclosing both 
estimates of unrecognized tax benefits allows financial statement users to better 
understand the risk and types of aggressive tax positions taken by the firm, and thus the 
amount, timing, and likelihood of future cash flows (Nichols et al. 2007).  Fourth, tax 
avoidance proxies are unable to discern the non-aggressive tax positions from the 
aggressive tax positions, whereas the FIN 48 provided measures focus specifically on the 
aggressive tax positions.  Fifth, the plethora of book-tax difference measures are annual 
measures, whereas the UTB and PermUTB are cumulative measures of aggressive tax 
positions for all open tax years.  Finally, UTB and PermUTB are stated in dollars, but 
other tax aggressiveness proxies are stated as percentages (book ETR, Cash ETR); 
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consequently, the FIN 48 provided proxies are easier to understand and to compare to 
other financial data.   
However, despite all of the improvements over other measures of tax aggression, 
UTBs are not a clean measure of tax aggression (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).  
Importantly, the unrecognized tax benefit disclosed at FIN 48 implementation is a 
function of two effects: firms’ use of aggressive tax positions and managers’ discretion 
over the amount of tax benefit that is recognized in the financial statements.  The more 
aggressive tax positions taken by a firm should produce a larger UTB.  Higher UTBs 
represent more uncertainty in tax positions taken by firm (i.e. more tax risk) (Hanlon and 
Heitzman 2010).  If UTBs are only affected by firms’ taking uncertain tax positions, 
then UTBs would be a clear measure of firms’ tax aggression.  However, because 
management is responsible for deciding how much of the aggressive tax positions’ 
benefits will be recognized in tax expense, the UTBs become an accounting accrual that 
is subject to managerial discretion.  For instance, if a firm takes an aggressive tax 
position and is conservative in recognizing the benefit (i.e. does not include the benefit 
in earnings), then the UTB should increase because the firm has recorded most or all of 
the tax benefit associated with the uncertain tax position as an accounting reserve.  On 
the other hand, if a firm takes an aggressive tax position and is aggressive in recognizing 
the benefit (i.e. recognizing most or all of the benefit in earnings), then the UTB should 
not increase because the firm has recorded most, or all, of the tax benefit associated with 
the uncertain tax position as a decrease to tax expense.  When the entire tax benefit is 
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included in earnings, the UTB would not capture firms’ aggressive tax positions.  
Consequently, UTBs could understate firms’ level of tax aggression.     
Fledgling FIN 48 Disclosure Literature 
The emergent literature exploring FIN 48 adoption is mostly descriptive and 
focuses on the magnitude of the cumulative effect adjustment (CEA) booked upon 
adopting this change in accounting principle and the UTB disclosed at adoption.  Zion 
and Varshney (2007) examine 361 calendar year-end firms from the S&P 500.  They 
decompose the reported total $141 billion UTB by industry and use UTBs to create a tax 
risk Z-score calculated on an industry basis.  They also discuss the possibility of the IRS 
using the FIN 48 disclosure as a roadmap to all aggressive tax positions.  Nichols et al. 
(2007) examine disclosures of 130 calendar year-end firms from the largest 200 
companies in the Fortune 500.  They examine the size and direction of the CEA of FIN 
48 adoption and compare it to the associated SAB 74 disclosure discussed in the 2006 
10-K, describing the amounts of UTB reported and the amount of UTB that, if 
recognized, would affect ETR (PermUTB).   
Blouin et al. (2007) hand collect FIN 48 adoption disclosures for the 100 largest 
and smallest calendar year-end, non-regulated and non-financial firms that are followed 
by at least five analysts examining disclosed changes in tax cushion in the quarters 
leading up to FIN 48 adoption; they document that the frequency of material decreases 
in tax cushion increased from 2005 to 2006.  Finally, they construct an aggregate 
measure of UTB for the largest 100 firms after discussing the problem associated with 
reported interest and penalties.   
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Dunbar et al. (2010) provide examples of permanent and temporary tax benefits, 
along with the effect of changes in UTBs on retained earnings, deferred tax assets and 
liabilities, and goodwill, hand collecting FIN 48 adoption disclosures for 348 calendar 
year-end S&P 500 firms.  They create a restated UTB, which incorporates the reported 
interest and penalties, finding that ranking firms on restated UTB levels could be 
misleading in evaluating the materiality of firms’ unrecognized tax benefits, and that 
scaling restated UTBs by firm size provides a different view of firms’ tax 
aggressiveness.   
Subsequent literature exploring FIN 48 disclosures evolves from descriptive 
papers into theory testing.  Frischmann et al. (2008) hand collect the FIN 48 adoption 
disclosures for 334 calendar year-end firms in the S&P 500.  They use the initial UTB 
disclosures under FIN 48 to investigate the market reaction to news of tax 
aggressiveness.  They find a significant positive association between cumulative 
abnormal returns surrounding the 10-Q filing date and UTBs; however, the association 
becomes insignificant after controlling for unexpected earnings.8
Song and Tucker (2008) investigate firm-specific factors that are correlated with 
the level of unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs reported at FIN 48 adoption).  They hand 
collect the FIN 48 adoption disclosures for 273 calendar year-end, industrial firms in the 
  Their findings suggest 
that investors respond positively to news of corporate tax aggressiveness and/or to 
information forcing a downward revision of their estimates of firms’ true tax burdens.   
                                                 
8 Frischmann et al. (2008) also decompose the UTB into its permanent (PermUTB) and temporary 
components (UTB less PermUTB) and rerun the market reaction test, controlling for unexpected earnings.  
They find a significant positive association between cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the 10-Q 
filing date and PermUTB. 
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S&P 500.  Results show sample firms that are larger, more profitable, have more selling 
and administrative expenses, lower growth rates, and more research and development 
activity, have larger UTBs.  Song and Tucker (2008) also explore how UTB influences 
firm value; finding that UTB is positively correlated with firm value, as measured by 
market to book ratio.  However, Song and Tucker (2008) do not control for the 
managerial discretion associated with the UTB.   
Cazier et al. (2009) examine the determinants of UTB and PermUTB as disclosed 
by firms in fiscal year 2007 10-Ks for 566 firms from the S&P 500 and S&P 400.9
Paralleling Song and Tucker (2008) and Cazier et al. (2009), I examine whether 
firms’ level of aggressive tax positions are associated with tax factors, by including 
proxies for firms’ incentives and abilities to engage in aggressive tax positions.  
Moreover, I extend this literature by investigating whether non-tax factors are associated 
with firms’ level of aggressive tax positions using a sample that incorporates large-,  
    
Cazier et al. (2009) find that UTBs are positively related to firm size, profitability, more 
extensive foreign operations, research and development, leverage, and negatively related 
to growth.  They also document that UTBs are negatively associated with financial 
reporting aggressiveness, contrary to other studies (Frank et al. 2009; Lisowsky 2008).  
They find that permanent aggressive tax positions (PermUTB) are positively related to 
profitability, more extensive foreign operations, higher research and development 
expenditures, and leverage.  However, Cazier et al. (2009) do not control for the 
managerial discretion associated with UTB.   
                                                 
9 The Cazier et al. (2009) sample includes financial and utility firms, whereas I exclude these firms.   
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mid-, and small-cap firms.  Finally, I control for the influence of managerial discretion 
on UTB, allowing my hypotheses and interpretations of results to focus on the 
determinants of firms’ level of aggressive tax positions, not the managerial discretion 
associated with the UTB.       
 22 
CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Impact of Financial Reporting Aggressiveness on Level of Aggressive Tax Positions  
Prior to FIN 48 implementation, the lack of transparency in accounting for 
income taxes enabled firms to use substantial discretion in reporting tax reserves.  
Dhaliwal et al. (2004) find evidence suggesting firms opportunistically adjust tax 
expense to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts during the fourth quarter.  The authors 
suggest that managers manipulate the undisclosed tax cushion to manage tax expense.  
Similarly, Blouin and Tuna (2007) suggest firms use their tax cushion to smooth 
earnings.  Gupta and Laux (2008) provide evidence that firms use managerial discretion 
in reporting the tax cushion to meet analysts’ forecasts.  Alexander et al. (2009) find 
evidence that the cumulative effect adjustment at FIN 48 adoption is positively related to 
a firms’ five-year record of meeting or beating analysts’ annual forecasts.  Although 
these papers suggest that firms’ use discretion over the tax cushion to manipulate 
earnings, they had to take uncertain tax positions before manipulating the UTB accrual.  
Cook et al. (2008) suggest that the results documented in Dhaliwal et al. (2004) are 
caused by both managerial discretion over tax accruals and tax avoidance behavior. 
Blouin and Tuna (2007) find that book ETR is positively and significantly related 
to changes in the tax cushion and interpret this result as evidence that firms recording 
more book tax expense undertake more aggressive tax planning.  They also provide 
some evidence that the tax cushion is positively correlated with measures of 
discretionary accruals, suggesting that managers use them as complements.  Lisowsky 
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(2008) separates the tax cushion into its possible drivers: tax aggressiveness (via tax 
shelters) and financial aggressiveness (via earnings management).  He finds that both tax 
shelters and earnings management are positively related to the tax cushion, suggesting 
that the tax cushion may be subject to both tax and financial reporting pressures.  Frank 
et al. (2009) examine whether firms’ aggressive financial reporting is related to their tax 
avoidance, finding that their proxy for financial reporting aggressiveness is positively 
related to their measure of tax avoidance.  Thus, the extant literature suggests that firms’ 
financial reporting aggressiveness is positively related to firms’ level of aggressive tax 
positions.  Given that UTB disclosed at FIN 48 adoption provides a clearer measure of 
past aggressive tax positions taken by the firm, I expect that firms’ financial reporting 
aggressiveness is positively associated with their level of aggressive tax positions.  This 
leads to my first hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, firms’ financial reporting aggressiveness is positively 
related to firms’ level of aggressive tax positions.   
 
Impact of Auditor Choice on Level of Aggressive Tax Positions 
 Next, I investigate effects of choice of auditor on firms’ level of aggressive tax 
positions.  Gupta and Laux (2008) state that it is the “role of the independent auditor to 
ensure the firm is providing a reasonable estimate” of the tax reserve (page 9).  Extant 
literature suggests that industry specialist auditors perform higher quality audits than 
non-industry specialist auditors because industry specialists are able to develop more 
industry-specific knowledge and expertise (Mayhew and Wilkins 2003).  Consequently, 
these auditors are better equipped to understand the client’s business and audit risks 
(Craswell et al. 1995; Gramling and Stone 2001; Hogan and Jeter 1999; Solomon et al. 
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1999) and to provide higher quality audits.  Balsam et al. (2003) find that firms 
employing industry specialist auditors have lower discretionary accruals and higher 
earnings response coefficients.10
Despite more rigid measurement requirements for unrecognized tax benefits 
under FIN 48, management still has considerable judgment over reporting the financial 
statement benefits of aggressive tax positions.  Theory suggests that managerial 
opportunism diminishes as auditor quality increases (Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 
1999; Balsam et al. 2003).  Gleason and Mills (2007) suggest that audit procedures 
enable auditors to constrain the managerial discretion over reporting the financial 
benefits of aggressive tax positions.  For example, if  the auditor believes that an 
aggressive tax position taken by the firm will not withstand the scrutiny of the relevant 
tax authorities, the auditor may require the client to record an unrecognized tax benefit, 
reducing the financial statement benefit of taking the aggressive tax position (Maydew 
and Shackelford 2007).  If that constrained managerial opportunism eliminates the 
financial reporting benefits of aggressive tax positions, managers’ incentives to take 
aggressive tax positions are reduced.  McGuire et al. (2010) posit that clients of an 
industry specialist auditor may engage in less tax avoidance because the auditor 
disallows recognition of all or part of the benefits of tax avoidance strategies on the 
financial statements.  The same logic can apply to firms taking aggressive tax positions; 
hence, firms with higher quality auditors may take fewer aggressive tax positions 
    
                                                 
10 In this study, my time frame (fiscal 2006) includes only the Big N auditors remaining after Andersen’s 
demise: 95% of my final sample is a Big 4 client.  Consequently, I am unable to test whether the uncertain 
tax positions of Big 4 clients are different from the uncertain tax positions of non-Big 4 clients.     
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expecting that the auditor would not allow recognition of the financial statement benefits 
of the tax position.     
However, McGuire et al. (2010) recognize that the ex ante relationship between 
auditor quality and tax avoidance activities is unclear.  Consequently, they also posit that 
clients of an industry specialist auditor may engage in more tax avoidance behavior 
because the industry specialist auditor’s “deep understanding of the nuances of tax 
avoidance strategies will lead them to recognize strategies that are not as aggressive and 
allow the clients to recognize all of the financial statement benefits associated with their 
tax avoidance strategies” (page 10).    They find that firms engaging an external audit 
firm that is an industry expert have significantly lower book ETR, larger DTAX, and 
larger BTDs than firms that do not hire an external audit firm that is an industry expert.  
Their results suggest that clients of industry specialist auditors engage in more tax 
avoidance activities.  If firms with higher quality auditors engage in more tax avoidance 
activities, they may also take more aggressive tax positions.  With these opposing effects 
on aggressive tax positions, I am unable to predict a direction, ex ante, on the association 
between auditor quality and aggressive tax positions.  My hypothesis stated in alternative 
form: 
H2a:  Ceteris paribus, an association exists between firms’ auditor quality and 
firms’ level of aggressive tax positions. 
 
Next, I examine how firms’ choice of using auditor provided tax services affects 
firms’ level of aggressive tax positions.  McGuire et al. (2010) state that external 
auditors directly affect a client’s tax avoidance activities by providing tax consulting 
services.  Mills et al. (1998) suggest that investments in tax planning lower firms’ book 
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effective tax rate.  They find that an additional $1 investment in tax planning generates a 
$4 reduction in tax liabilities, on average.  Dhaliwal et al. (2004) find that firms lower 
book ETR in the fourth quarter to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.  They suggest that 
firms’ manage tax accruals to opportunistically lower book ETR.  Cook et al. (2008) find 
that firms not only use managerial discretion over tax accruals to opportunistically 
manage book ETR in the fourth quarter, but also engage in tax avoidance activities to 
lower book ETR in the fourth quarter.  Cook et al. use tax fees paid to the auditor as a 
proxy for tax avoidance behavior.  Cook and Omer (2010) suggest that firms’ exhibit 
less tax avoidance or tax aggression after they decrease the fees paid to their auditor for 
tax services or no longer use auditor provided tax services.  My hypothesis stated in 
alternative form: 
H2b: Ceteris paribus, firms’ auditor provided tax services are positively related 
to firms’ level of aggressive tax positions. 
 
Impact of Analyst Coverage on Level of Aggressive Tax Positions 
Next, I examine whether analyst coverage affects firms’ level of aggressive tax 
positions.  The literature views analyst coverage (i.e. the number of sell-side analysts 
following a firm) as a proxy for external monitoring (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Healy 
and Palepu 2001; Yu 2008).  Yu (2008) investigates whether greater analyst coverage 
increases pressure on managers to manipulate earnings or, alternatively, whether 
analysts act as external monitors of managers, finding that firms with more analyst 
coverage engage in less earnings management relative to firms with less analyst 
coverage, suggesting that analysts serve as external monitors of managers.  This result 
suggests the managerial opportunism associated with an aggressive tax position will 
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diminish as the number of analysts covering a firm increases.  To the extent that 
constraining opportunism eliminates the financial reporting benefits of aggressive tax 
positions, managers’ incentives to take aggressive tax positions will be reduced.  If firms 
with a larger analyst following have less incentive to take risky tax positions, then I 
expect that analyst coverage is negatively related to aggressive tax positions. 
My expectation is consistent with prior literature.  Frank et al. (2009) find a 
significantly negative relationship between measures of tax avoidance (DTAX and book-
tax differences) and sell-side analysts tracking a firm.  Cazier et al. (2009) anticipate, but 
do not find within their sample, a negative relationship between firms’ UTBs or 
PermUTBs and analyst coverage.  Consequently, my hypothesis, stated in the alternative 
form: 
H3: Ceteris paribus, firms’ analyst coverage level is negatively related to firms’ 
level of aggressive tax positions. 
 
Impact of Corporate Governance Quality on Level of Aggressive Tax Positions 
 
The extant literature has extensively examined the association between the 
quality of corporate governance and the quality of financial reporting, linking both board 
independence and corporate governance to increased firm performance (Brickley et al. 
1994; Byrd and Hickman 1992; Weisbach 1988), lower discretionary accruals (Klein 
2002), and lower incidence of financial fraud (Dechow and Skinner 1996; Beasley 
1996).  Chung et al. (2002) find that institutional ownership constrains earnings 
management.  Institutional ownership is widely used in the literature as a corporate 
governance proxy for quality monitoring because institutional owners have stronger 
incentives and greater ability to aggressively monitor managerial performance than non-
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institutional owners (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Coffee 1991; Bhojraj and Sengupta 
2003).  As strong corporate governance constrains the firms’ discretion over recognizing 
the financial reporting benefits of aggressive tax positions, managers’ incentives to take 
aggressive tax positions decrease.  Consequently, I expect there is a negative association 
between strong corporate governance and firms’ level of aggressive tax positions.   
However, prior literature shows institutional owners encourage firms to take 
corporate risks (Hill and Snell 1988; Hansen and Hill 1991; Wright et al. 1996). Wright 
et al. (1996) defines corporate risk taking as firms’ analysis and selection of projects 
with uncertain expected outcomes and uncertain cash flows.  To the extent that strong 
corporate governance is associated with risk-taking behavior, I expect that strong 
corporate governance is positively associated with firms’ level of aggressive tax 
positions. With these opposing effects, I am unable to predict a direction, ex ante, on the 
association between strong corporate governance and firms’ level of aggressive tax 
positions.  This leads to my fourth hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
H4:   Ceteris paribus, an association exists between firms’ quality of corporate 
governance and firms’ level of aggressive tax positions. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Research Design 
Control Variables for Firms’ Discretion over Recognizing Benefits of Aggressive Tax 
Positions 
Since the goal of this paper is to examine the determinants of aggressive tax 
positions, I start by controlling for firms’ discretion over recognizing the financial 
reporting benefits of aggressive tax positions.   FIN 48 adoption is considered a change 
in accounting principle from SFAS 5; consequently, firms are required to report a 
cumulative effect adjustment (CEA) for FIN 48 adoption.  FIN 48 specifies that the CEA 
is measured as the difference between the liability for UTBs measured pre- and post-
adoption and that this difference is recorded as an adjustment to retained earnings 
(Nichols et al. 2007).  The CEA is the change to UTB associated with past managerial 
discretion over the financial reporting benefits of permanent aggressive tax positions 
(∆PermUTB).  Some firms also report how FIN 48 adoption changed gross UTB, my 
proxy for ∆TotalUTB.11
                                                 
11 If a firm only reports the cumulative effect adjustment of adopting FIN 48, the ∆TotalUTB equals 
∆PermUTB. 
    I calculate the change to UTBs at FIN 48 adoption associated 
with temporary aggressive tax positions (∆TempUTB) is the difference between 
∆TotalUTB and ∆PermUTB.  I collectively refer the changes in UTB and its permanent 
and temporary components at FIN 48 adoption as ∆UTB.  Again, ∆UTB proxies for 
firms’ discretion over reporting the financial benefits of past aggressive tax positions.  
Based on the various interpretations allowed under SFAS 5, the ∆UTB recorded by firms 
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could be positive, negative, or immaterial.  Table 1 provides detailed variable 
definitions.   
Control Variables for Firms’ Incentives and Abilities to Engage in Aggressive Tax 
Positions 
Next I identify which firm characteristics are associated with the level of 
unrecognized tax benefit (UTB), and both its permanent (PermUTB) and temporary 
(TempUTB) components.  I regress each measure of unrecognized tax benefit on the nine 
firm characteristics shown in prior literature (Song and Tucker 2008; Cazier et al. 2009) 
to proxy for firms’ incentives and abilities to engage in aggressive tax positions are also 
associated with firms’ aggressive tax positions: (1) natural log of total assets (Size) 
proxies for firm size; (2) pre-tax return on assets (PT_ROA) proxies for firm 
profitability; (3) the ratio of total debt to total assets proxies for leverage (Leverage); (4) 
a categorical variable coded 1 when the sum of foreign pretax income for 2002-2006 is 
positive (ForeignDum) proxies for presence of foreign operations; (5) the ratio of 
research and development expenditures to net sales is summed over the five years prior 
to FIN 48 adoption (R&DexpRatio) as a proxy for research and development intensity; 
(6) selling, general, and administrative expenditures scaled by lagged total assets 
(SG&A) and the Dyreng et al. (2008) five-year Cash ETR (CashETR5) proxy for firms’ 
investments in tax planning; (7) the market-to-book (MTB) ratio proxies for firm value; 
and (8) a three-year percentage change in sales (Sales_GR) proxies for growth.   
Larger, more sophisticated firms have more opportunities to engage in tax 
planning (Gupta and Newberry 1997; Wilson 2009). Consequently, I expect firm size to 
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be positively associated with firms’ level of aggressive tax positions.  More profitable 
firms have a greater incentive (i.e. more income to offset) to establish aggressive tax 
positions (Gupta and Newberry 1997; Frank et al. 2009).  I expect a positive association 
between profitability and level of aggressive tax positions.  Graham and Tucker (2006) 
show that firms use less debt when they engage in tax sheltering, suggesting a 
substitution effect between tax sheltering and leverage.  However, Song and Tucker 
(2008) suggest that a complementary effect exists between leverage and tax sheltering 
only when firms have high profitability.  Cazier et al. (2009) find a positive relationship 
between leverage and UTBs.  Because of these conflicting findings, I do not proffer an 
expectation on the association between leverage and aggressive tax positions.   
Firms with foreign operations have more opportunities to engage in tax planning 
(Rego 2003; Lisowsky 2008; Wilson 2009).  I expect that firms with foreign operations 
have more aggressive tax positions.  Firms with more R&D activity have more 
opportunities to engage in tax planning activities (Dyreng et al. 2008; Wilson 2009) 
because R&D can generate tax credits.  Although, not every R&D activity meets the tax 
credit criteria (Song and Tucker 2008).  Consequently, firms may book reserves for 
those uncertain R&D expenditures.  I expect that firms with more extensive R&D 
activity have more aggressive tax positions.   
Firms that invest more in tax planning likely take more aggressive tax positions 
(Mills et al. 1998; Cook et al. 2008; Song and Tucker 2008).  Song and Tucker (2008) 
suggest that firm value is positively related to UTBs; consequently, I expect firm value is 
positively related to level of aggressive tax positions.  Growth firms have less need for 
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aggressive tax planning because they have ample tax deductions to offset taxable income 
(Dyreng et al. 2008; Song and Tucker 2008).  Hence, I expect that firms with more 
growth have fewer aggressive tax positions.  Finally, I also control for the probability 
that a firm engages in tax sheltering.  Lisowsky (2010) constructs a probability score to 
determine whether firms engage in tax sheltering activities, which are the most 
aggressive tax positions.  Lisowsky (2008) and Lisowsky et al. (2010) find that the tax 
shelter probability score is positively related to firms’ level of tax aggressiveness.  I 
employ the Wilson (2009) tax shelter probability score to determine the probability that 
a firm engages in tax shelters.12
Next, I regress proxies for level of aggressive tax positions on financial reporting 
aggressiveness, auditor choice, analyst coverage and corporate governance, controlling 
for firms’ managerial opportunism associated with the tax accrual and firms’ incentives 
and abilities to engage in aggressive tax positions as discussed above.  I use three 
measures of unrecognized tax benefits as proxies for level of aggressive tax positions: 
the UTB disclosed at FIN 48 adoption (UTB) and its permanent (PermUTB) and 
temporary (TempUTB) components.  Both the UTB and PermUTB are disclosed by the 
firm at FIN 48 adoption.  TempUTB is calculated as UTB less PermUTB.  Ex ante, I 
   Based on the Wilson tax shelter probability score, I 
create an indicator variable splitting the sample into firms that have a high and low 
probability of engaging in a tax shelter.  I expect firms with a higher tax shelter 
probability score to engage in more aggressive tax positions.   
                                                 
12 Firm size and engaging a Big N auditor are two of the most important predictors of tax shelter behavior 
in the Lisowsky tax shelter probability score.  Because my sample is based on the S&P 1500, which 
includes large firms that employ Big 4 auditors, Lisowsky’s tax shelter probability score does not provide 
enough variance within my sample.  Consequently, I employ the Wilson tax shelter probability score. 
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expect the explanatory variables to have similar effects on both the permanent and 
temporary components of UTB.  Model (1) is as follows:        
Unrecognized Tax Benefiti = α0 + β1 ∆UTB + β2 Sizei + β3 PT_ROAi  
+ β4 Leveragei +β5 ForeignDumi + β6 R&DexpRatioi + β7 SG&Ai  
+ β8 CashETR5i + β9 MTBi + β10 Sales_GRi + β11 TaxShelterDumi  
+ β12 DAi + β13 MB_Recordi + β14 LCEM_Recordi + β15 BookETR5i  
+ β16 Ind_Specialisti + β17 TaxFeeRatioi + β18 Num_Ani  
+ β19 Bd_Ind%i + β20 IO%i  + β21 StrongGscorei               (1) 
 
Variables for Firms’ Financial Reporting Aggressiveness  
  To investigate whether firms’ financial reporting aggressiveness is positively 
related to firms’ level of aggressive tax positions (H1), I use four proxies of financial 
reporting aggressiveness.  The financial reporting aggressiveness variables are calculated 
over a multi-year time period because the UTBs reflect aggressive tax positions over a 
multi-year period.  The first proxy for financial reporting aggressiveness is pre-tax, 
performance adjusted, modified Jones discretionary accruals, summed over five years 
(DA).  The literature has shown that tax reserve is positively related to discretionary 
accruals (Blouin and Tuna 2007; Lisowsky 2008; Frank et al. 2009).  Consequently, I 
expect a positive association between DA and unrecognized tax benefits.   
The second and third measures of financial reporting aggressiveness are firms’ 
five-year records of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts (MB_Record) and firms’ 
record of last chance earnings management to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts 
(LCEM_Record).  Blouin and Tuna (2007) find that firms use their tax cushions to 
smooth earnings.  Gupta and Laux (2008) provide evidence that firms use managerial 
discretion in reporting the tax cushion to meet analysts’ forecasts.  I calculate 
MB_Record as the ratio of the number of times in the past five years that firms were able 
 34 
to meet or beat annual analysts’ forecasts divided by number of years of available data.  
Dhaliwal et al. (2004) find that firms use tax expense to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts 
during the fourth quarter; the authors suggest that managers use their managerial 
discretion over the undisclosed tax cushion to manage tax expense opportunistically.  
Cook et al. (2008) suggest that firms use both managerial discretion over tax accruals 
and tax avoidance behavior to lower book ETR in the fourth quarter.  I calculate 
LCEM_Record as the percentage of quarters the firm used last chance earnings 
management to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts when the firms did meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts.  I expect that both MB_Record and LCEM_Record are positively 
associated with UTBs.   
The final proxy of financial reporting aggressiveness is book ETR, calculated as 
the five-year sum of tax expense over the five-year sum of pre-tax income less special 
items (BookETR5).  Blouin and Tuna (2007) posit that book ETR could be capturing 
greater cushion activity for profitable firms.  They find that book ETR is positively and 
significantly related to changes in tax cushion. They suggest that firms recording more 
GAAP tax expense undertake more aggressive tax planning.  I expect that BookETR5 
and UTBs are positively related.   
Variables for Firms’ Choice of Auditor  
Next, I examine auditor choice effects: industry specialist auditor and tax fee 
ratio.  To test H2a, I employ an indicator variable for industry specialist auditors 
(Ind_Specialist) to proxy for auditor quality, consistent with Mayhew and Wilkins 
(2003).  McGuire et al. (2010) state that the ex ante relationship between auditor quality 
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and tax avoidance activities is unclear, the same logic can be applied to the ex ante 
relationship between auditor quality and engaging in aggressive tax positions.  If 
industry specialist auditors are able to constrain the managerial opportunism to the point 
of eliminating the financial reporting benefits of aggressive tax positions, then firms may 
engage in fewer aggressive tax positions.   However, clients of an industry specialist 
auditor may engage in more aggressive tax positions because the industry specialist 
auditor’s expertise associated with tax avoidance strategies leads them to take aggressive 
tax positions that have stronger facts, which enables the position to better withstand the 
scrutiny of relevant tax authorities.  McGuire et al. (2010) find that clients of industry 
specialist auditors engage in more tax avoidance activities.  Consequently, clients of 
industry specialist auditors may also engage in more aggressive tax positions.  Thus, I 
am unable to predict a direction ex ante on the association between Ind_Specialist 
categorical variable and unrecognized tax benefits.   
To test H2b, I focus on the tax fee ratio (TaxFeeRatio) as a proxy for auditor-
provided tax services.  As the tax fee ratio increases, the audit firm is likely providing 
the client with more tax avoidance strategies, including aggressive tax positions.  The 
extant literature suggests that firms’ tax avoidance behavior is positively correlated with 
fees paid to the auditors for tax services (Mills et al. 1998; Cook et al. 2008).  
Consequently, I expect a positive association between the TaxFeeRatio and 
unrecognized tax benefits.   
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Variable for Firms’ Level of Analyst Coverage  
To test whether firms’ level of analyst coverage is negatively related to 
aggressive tax positions (H3), I calculate the number of sell-side analysts covering the 
firm at year-end 2006 and scale it by lagged total assets (Num_An).  Frank et al. (2009) 
and Cazier et al. (2009) expect a negative relationship between firms’ analyst coverage 
and firms’ tax aggressiveness.  If firms with greater analyst following have less incentive 
to take risky tax positions because the analyst coverage eliminates the financial reporting 
benefits of such positions, then I expect that analyst coverage is negatively related to 
UTBs. 
Variables for Firms’ Quality of Corporate Governance  
To test the association between corporate governance quality and level of 
aggressive tax positions (H4), I examine three dimensions of corporate governance: 
board independence, institutional ownership, and shareholders’ rights.  I calculate the 
percentage of independent members on the board of directors during the 2006 fiscal year 
(Bd_Indep%).  If more independent boards are able to constrain the managerial 
opportunism to the point of eliminating the financial reporting benefits of aggressive tax 
positions, then firms may engage in fewer aggressive tax positions.   This would 
generate a negative association between board independence and UTBs.  However, the 
association between board independence and UTBs may be positive if more independent 
boards encourage firms to take aggressive tax positions to increase firm value.  Ex ante I 
am unable to predict an association between board independence and UTBs.   
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Next I examine how institutional ownership affects aggressive tax positions.   I 
calculate the ratio of shares held by institutional owners to the number of shares 
outstanding at year-end 2006 (IO%).  Extant literature shows that institutional owners 
inhibit managerially opportunistic financial reporting (Chung et al. 2002), which could 
reduce managers’ incentives to take aggressive tax positions.  This suggests a negative 
association between institutional owners and UTBs.  However, prior literature shows 
that institutional owners encourage firms to engage in corporate risk taking activities 
(Hill and Snell 1988; Hansen and Hill 1991; Wright et al. 1996), suggesting a positive 
association between institutional owners and UTBs.  Ex ante I am unable to predict an 
association between board independence and UTBs.  
Finally I examine how shareholders’ rights affect aggressive tax positions, I 
employ the Gompers et al. (2003) index (G-index) as a proxy for shareholders’ rights.13
Sample Selection 
  
I set StrongGscore equal to one if the firms’ G-indices are less than or equal to the 
sample mean; zero otherwise.  Ex ante I am unable to predict an association between 
board independence and UTBs. 
Table 2, Panel A summarizes my sample selection process.  The initial sample 
starts with the S&P 1500 firms as of December 29, 2006.  I discard 26 firms not included 
in the Compustat annual file.  Next, I restrict the sample to calendar year firms (1,023 
firms), ensuring that all sample firms adopted FIN 48 on the same date, January 1, 2007.  
                                                 
13 The Gompers et al. (2003) index (G-index) measures managerial entrenchment. The G-index is a 
conglomeration of 24 different provisions, spanning five potential determinants of firm’s takeover 
vulnerability: tactics for delaying hostile bidders, voting rights, director and officer protection, other 
takeover defenses, and state laws.  The G-index ranges from 0 to 24, where low scores indicate higher 
quality corporate governance. 
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Then I remove all 39 firms classified as REITs (SIC code 6798) and 266 firms in 
regulated industries such as financial services (SIC code 60-69) and utilities (SIC code 
49).14
For each of the remaining 700 companies, I collect the following data from the 
tax footnote:  1) the gross UTB after adoption on January 1, 2007, (UTB) 2) the amount 
of UTB that, if recognized, would affect the firm’s effective tax rate (PermUTB), 3) the 
change to the gross UTB at FIN 48 adoption (∆TotalUTB), and 4) the change to the 
gross UTB that affects shareholders’ equity or retained earnings at FIN 48 adoption 
(∆PermUTB) .
   Next, I hand collect the FIN 48 adoption disclosures for first quarter 2007 Form 
10-Q reports filed with the SEC for the 718 remaining companies in the sample; 18 firms 
had not filed their first quarter 2007 Form 10-Q.      
15
Table 2, Panel B presents the industry breakdown of the S&P 1500 and the 
sample firms.  Using two digit Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) codes, the 
sample includes firms from 48 industries.  However 44.32 percent of the sample is 
concentrated in only 5 industries:  11.17 percent from business services (SIC 73), 10.28 
  I extract firm-level financial data from Compustat, analysts’ forecasts 
from I/B/E/S, auditor and audit fee data from Audit Analytics, board of directors’ data 
from Corporate Library, institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters, and 
governance score from RiskMetrics.  When possible, I hand collect missing data.  
Finally, I eliminate 136 firms lacking data required to compute one or more explanatory 
variables, leaving 564 firms in the sample. 
                                                 
14 REITs are essentially pass-through entities; consequently, they have little or no corporate income tax 
liabilities.  Firms in regulated industries are influenced by different reporting incentives and regulatory 
scrutiny. 
15 I also collect the amount accrued for associated interest and penalties and the location of interest and 
penalties in the financial statements so I can adjust the UTBs for interest and penalties. 
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percent from chemicals (SIC 28), 8.33 percent from control and optical instruments (SIC 
38), 7.45 percent from electronic equipment (SIC 36), and 7.09 percent from industrial 
machinery and computer equipment (SIC 35).        
Venn diagrams in Figure 2 provide more detail about the composition of firms’ 
unrecognized tax benefits.  In the full hand-collected sample of 700 firms, 53 firms 
reported UTB as immaterial or zero. 16
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
  Of the 632 firms that reported permanent UTBs, 
200 firms reported only permanent UTBs.  Of the 447 firms that reported temporary 
UTBs, only 15 did not also report permanent UTBs.  In the final sample of 564 firms, 36 
firms reported a zero or immaterial amount of UTBs.  Of the 517 firms that reported 
permanent UTBs, 162 firms reported only permanent UTBs.  Of the 366 firms that 
reported temporary UTBs, 11 firms did not report permanent UTBs.  Comparing the two 
Venn diagrams shows that 17 firms reported no UTBs, 38 firms reported only permanent 
UTBs, 4 firms reported only temporary UTBs, and 77 firms reporting both permanent 
and temporary UTBs were lost due to data constraints.  The Venn diagrams depict 
variation among the types of aggressive tax positions taken by firms.  I leave it to future 
research to investigate why firms choose a particular mix of aggressive tax positions 
(none, only permanent, only temporary, or a combination of permanent and temporary).   
 Table 3, Panel A displays the descriptive statistics for the final sample.  All 
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom five percent except indicator variables.  
The mean (median) unrecognized tax benefits disclosed by sample firms at FIN 48 
                                                 
16 I record a firm’s UTB as immaterial when the firm explicitly states they have no unrecognized tax 
benefits or they have no significant or material unrecognized tax benefits.  
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adoption is 1.47 (1.04) percent of lagged assets.  The mean (median) of the permanent 
and temporary components of unrecognized tax benefits disclosed by the sample firms at 
FIN 48 adoption is 1.10 (0.72) and 0.35 (0.13) percent of lagged assets, respectively.  
The sheer size of the UTB and PermUTB suggests that UTBs are economically 
significant to sample firms.  These percentages are in line with those reported by Blouin 
et al. (2010), Song and Tucker (2008), and Dunbar et al. (2010). 
 The mean (median) change to unrecognized tax benefits disclosed by sample 
firms at FIN 48 adoption is 0.17 (0.00) percent of lagged assets.  The mean (median) 
change to unrecognized tax benefits that does and does not affect retained earnings 
disclosed by sample firms at FIN 48 adoption is 0.10 (0.00) and 0.04 (0.00) percent of 
lagged assets, respectively.  The positive skewness with the change to unrecognized tax 
benefit variables indicates that the effects of FIN 48 adoption are substantially larger for 
some firms. 
The median sample firm has log of assets of 7.66, pre-tax return on assets of 
10.72 percent, leverage of 20.53 percent of lagged assets, a market to book ratio of 2.65, 
and a three-year average sales growth of 13.98 percent.  Table 3, Panel B provides the 
descriptive statistics of the S&P 1500 for the same time period as the sample firms.  The 
median firm for the S&P 1500 has log of assets of 7.75, pre-tax return on assets of 8.42 
percent, leverage of 20.33 percent of lagged assets, a market to book ratio of 2.45, and a 
three-year average sales growth of 13.70 percent.  The similarities between my sample 
and the S&P 1500 suggest that my sample is representative of the larger firm population, 
which allows for more general extrapolation.  Previous FIN 48 studies focus on only 
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large firms (Nichols et al. 2007; Blouin et al. 2007), the S&P 500 (Zion and Varshney 
2007; Frischmann et al. 2008; Song and Tucker 2008; Dunbar et al. 2010), or the S&P 
500 and S&P MidCap 400 (Cazier et al. 2009).   
 The descriptive statistics suggest that the mean (median) for the five-year record 
of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts (MB_Record) is 76 (80) percent.  Although this 
seems high, these firms have the highest analyst coverage, perhaps increasing the 
importance of meeting earnings targets.  Additionally, the mean (median) percentage of 
shares held by institutions (IO%) is 83.66 (84.93) percent.  The composition of specific 
S&P index funds likely elevates the percentage of institutional ownership for this 
sample.   
 Panel A of Table 4 presents the correlations between the three proxies of 
aggressive tax positions and controls for firms’ discretion in recognizing the financial 
statement benefits of aggressive tax positions and firms’ incentives and abilities to 
engage in aggressive tax positions and tax shelters.  For both Pearson and Spearman 
correlations, UTB and PermUTB are positively associated with ΔTotalUTB and 
∆PermUTB, while TempUTB is positively related to all three ∆UTB variables.  
Consistent with expectations, UTB and PermUTB are positively associated with Size, 
ForeignDum, R&DExpRatio, SG&A, MTB and TaxShelterDum for both Pearson and 
Spearman correlations.  However, TempUTB is only positively associated with Size, 
R&DExpRatio, TaxShelterDum for both the Pearson and Spearman correlations.    
Panel B of Table 4 exhibits the correlations between the three proxies of firms’ 
level of aggressive tax positions and controls for firms’ discretion in recognizing the 
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financial statement benefits of aggressive tax positions and proxies of firms’ financial 
reporting aggressiveness, auditor quality, analyst coverage, and corporate governance.  
Only significant correlations in both Pearson and Spearman correlations are discussed.  
Among the financial reporting aggressiveness variables, LCEM_Record is positively 
correlated with all three measures of unrecognized tax benefits, while MB_Record is 
positively correlated with UTB and PermUTB.  TaxFeeRatio is the only choice of 
auditor proxy that is significantly correlated with UTB and PermUTB.  Neither analyst 
coverage nor the corporate governance proxies are significantly correlated with the three 
measures of unrecognized tax benefits.  However, analyst coverage is positively 
correlated with all three ∆UTB variables.  As with Panel A, Panel B shows a number of 
significant correlations between the explanatory variables, suggesting caution in 
interpreting bivariate results. 
Multivariate Analysis 
Controls for Firms’ Incentives and Abilities to Engage in Aggressive Tax Positions 
 
Table 5 displays the OLS results of regressing unrecognized tax benefits on the 
hypothesized variables, controlling for firms’ discretion in recognizing the financial 
statement benefits of aggressive tax positions and firms’ incentives and abilities to 
engage in aggressive tax positions and tax sheltering.  Columns 1, 3, and 5 in Table 5 
report the results of regressing the three proxies for unrecognized tax benefits on just the 
proxies for controlling for firms’ discretion in recognizing the financial statement 
benefits of aggressive tax positions and firms’ incentives and abilities to engage in 
aggressive tax positions and tax sheltering.  Because these results are not significantly 
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different from the results reported for Model (1), I focus on the results of the full model.  
Table 5, column 2 suggests that UTB is positively and significantly related to ΔUTB (ρ ≤ 
0.01), Size (ρ ≤ 0.01), ForeignDum (ρ ≤ 0.05), R&DexpRatio (ρ ≤ 0.01), SG&A (ρ ≤ 
0.05), MTB (ρ ≤ 0.01), and TaxShelterDum (ρ ≤ 0.05).  These associations are in the 
expected direction and consistent with the findings of Song and Tucker (2008) and 
Cazier et al. (2009).  Ex ante, I did not predict a signed association between leverage and 
unrecognized tax benefits; results suggest an insignificant association between UTB and 
Leverage.  This result is also inconsistent with Cazier et al. (2009).  These results 
suggest that firms that are larger, have foreign operations, spend more on research and 
development activities, spend more on selling, general, and administrative expenditures, 
have higher firm value, or are classified as a firm that engages in tax sheltering have 
more aggressive tax positions.  Two-digit SIC industry indicator variables are included 
in all the models, but are not tabulated.     
Next, I parse the UTB into its permanent (PermUTB) and temporary components 
(TempUTB); ex ante, my predicted associations between explanatory variables and UTB 
do not change when analyzing the permanent and temporary components.    Table 5, 
column 4 presents regression results for Model (1) using PermUTB as the proxy for 
unrecognized tax benefits.  The results are similar to those reported for UTB, except 
PermUTB has only a marginally significant, positive association Size (ρ ≤ 0.10) and 
SG&A (ρ ≤ 0.10).   Unlike UTB, PermUTB has a marginally significant, positive 
association PT_ROA (ρ ≤ 0.10), suggesting the firms with higher pre-tax return on assets 
take more permanent aggressive tax positions.  Specifically, firms that are larger, more 
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profitable, have foreign operations, spend more on research and development activities, 
spend more on selling, general, and administrative expenditures, have higher firm value, 
or are classified as a firm that engages in tax sheltering take more permanent aggressive 
tax positions. 
Table 5, column 6 displays the results for Model (1) when using TempUTB as the 
proxy for unrecognized tax benefits which, if recognized, will not affect the firm’s 
effective tax rate.  The results show that TempUTB is positively and significantly related 
to ΔUTB (ρ ≤ 0.01) and Size (ρ ≤ 0.05).  The results suggest that firms that are larger 
engage in more temporary aggressive tax positions.   
Association between Financial Reporting Aggressiveness and Level of Aggressive Tax 
Positions 
To test H1, I focus on the four proxies for financial reporting aggressiveness: 
pre-tax performance adjusted, modified Jones discretionary accruals (DA), firms’ five-
year record of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts (MBRecord), firms’ five-year 
record of using last chance earnings management to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts 
(LCEM_Record), and a five-year measure of book ETR (BookETR5).  I expect that 
financial reporting aggressiveness is positively related to aggressive tax positions.  Table 
5, columns 2 and 4 report that UTB and PermUTB are positively and significantly 
associated with one proxy of financial reporting aggressiveness, LCEM_Record (ρ ≤ 
0.01).  This suggests that firms using decreases in fourth quarter ETR to meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts are engaging in more aggressive and permanent aggressive tax 
positions.  UTB and PermUTB are not significantly associated to the other proxies of 
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financial reporting aggressiveness.  Overall, this result shows some support for H1,  
which extends the findings of  Lisowsky (2008) and Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009). 
 Table 5, column 6 reports that TempUTB is positively and significantly 
associated with LCEM_Record (ρ ≤ 0.05), and BookETR5 (ρ ≤ 0.05); all associations are 
as predicted.  However, TempUTB is not significantly associated with DA or 
MB_Record.  Overall, I find that temporary unrecognized tax benefits are associated 
more with financial reporting incentives than tax-oriented measures; this result is 
consistent with the finding of Phillips et al. (2003) and Hanlon (2005) that temporary 
BTDs are reflective of earnings management activities.            
Association between Choice of Auditor and Level of Aggressive Tax Positions 
 To test H2a, I use a categorical variable indicating that the auditor is an industry 
specialist (Ind_Specialist).  A negative association suggests firms’ likelihood of taking 
aggressive tax positions is mitigated by the auditor industry specialist constraining firms’ 
discretion over reporting the benefits of aggressive tax positions. On the other hand, a 
positive association implies that the auditor’s expertise about the industry leads firms to 
take more aggressive tax positions that have facts strong enough to withstand the 
scrutiny of any relevant taxing authority.  Ex ante, I am unable to make a prediction 
about the association between auditor quality and firms’ UTBs.  Table 5 reports that 
Ind_Specialist is insignificantly associated with UTB, PermUTB, and TempUTB, 
suggesting that auditor quality as proxied by industry specialization has no impact on 
firms’ taking aggressive tax positions.  Consequently, there is no support for H2a.   
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Hypothesis 2b (H2b) predicts that auditor provided tax services are positively 
associated with aggressive tax positions.  To test H2b, I use the tax fee ratio 
(TaxFeeRatio) to measure extent of auditor-provided tax services.  Table 5, column 2 
and column 4, reports that UTB and PermUTB are positively associated with 
TaxFeeRatio at (ρ ≤ 0.05) and (ρ ≤ 0.10), respectively.  Columns 6 reports that 
TempUTB is insignificantly associated with TaxFeeRatio.  Taken together, these results 
suggest that firms take more permanent aggressive tax positions as fees paid to the 
auditor for tax services increase.  Consequently, there is some support for H2b.     
Association between Analyst Coverage and Level of Aggressive Tax Positions 
 Hypothesis 3 (H3) predicts that the number of analysts covering a firm is 
negatively associated with aggressive tax positions.  Consistent with H3, Table 5, 
column 2 reports that the association between UTB and Num_An is negative, but only 
marginally significant (ρ ≤ 0.01).  Table 5, column 4 reports that PermUTB is negatively 
and significantly associated with Num_An (ρ ≤ 0.05).  These results suggest that firms 
with greater analyst coverage have less incentive to engage in aggressive tax positions, 
specifically permanent aggressive tax positions.  These results are consistent with the 
Frank et al. (2009) finding that analyst coverage is negatively and significantly 
associated with tax reporting aggressiveness; however, the results differ from Cazier et 
al. (2009) who expect, but do not find, a negative relationship between analyst coverage 
and UTB or PermUTB.  Whereas analyst coverage is significantly related to 
unrecognized tax benefits and permanent unrecognized tax benefits, Table 5, column 6 
reports that TempUTB is not significantly associated with Num_An, suggesting that 
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analyst are interested only in permanent aggressive tax positions, which affect firms’ 
earnings. 
Association between Corporate Governance Quality and Level of Aggressive Tax 
Positions 
 Finally, Hypothesis 4 (H4) predicts an association between corporate governance 
quality and level of aggressive tax positions.  I employ three proxies of corporate 
governance quality: board independence (Bd_Ind%), institutional ownership (IO%), and 
shareholders’ rights (StrongGscore).  Table 5, reports that firms’ board independence 
percentage (Bd_Ind%) and institutional ownership percentage (IO%) are insignificantly 
associated with UTB, PermUTB, and TempUTB.  However, Table 5, column 2 reports 
that UTB is positively and marginally significantly associated with StrongGscore (ρ ≤ 
0.10), suggesting that firms with strong shareholders’ rights (StrongGscore) take more 
aggressive tax positions.  Overall, there is minimal support for H4.   
Multivariate Analyses with Sample Split by Changes to UTB at FIN 48 Adoption 
 Since the goal of this paper is to examine the determinants of aggressive tax 
positions, I control for firms’ discretion over recognizing the financial benefits of 
aggressive tax positions by using the changes to UTB (∆TotalUTB) and the changes to 
its permanent (∆PermUTB) and temporary components (∆TempUTB) reported at FIN 48 
adoption.    The ∆PermUTB is the change to UTB that is recorded as a cumulative effect 
adjustment to retained earnings at FIN 48 adoption.  Firms were required to report the 
∆PermUTB because the adoption of FIN 48 is considered a change in accounting 
principle.  Although not required, some firms also reported the change to gross UTB 
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reported by firms at FIN 48 adoption (∆TotalUTB).  I calculate the ∆TempUTB as the 
difference between ∆TotalUTB and ∆PermUTB.  I collectively refer to the changes in 
UTB due to FIN 48 adoption as ∆UTB.  Based on the various interpretations allowed 
under SFAS 5, the ∆UTB recorded by firms could be positive, negative, or immaterial.   
 An increase to UTB at FIN 48 adoption (i.e. positive ∆UTB) suggests that firms 
were recognizing more of the tax benefits associated with aggressive tax positions in 
earnings under the SFAS 5 regime than is allowed under the new FIN 48 requirements.  
Since the firms’ aggressive tax positions are held constant at FIN 48 adoption, the 
increase in UTB is not due to firms taking additional aggressive tax positions, but solely 
due to a decrease in firms’ discretion over the financial reporting benefits of aggressive 
tax positions.  Hence, these firms were more aggressive in their reporting of the tax 
benefits prior to FIN 48 adoption.   
A decrease to UTB at FIN 48 adoption (i.e. a negative ∆UTB)  suggests that 
firms were recognizing fewer of the tax benefits associated with aggressive tax positions 
in earnings under the SFAS 5 regime than is required under the new FIN 48 
requirements. These firms were more conservative in their reporting of the tax benefits 
prior to FIN 48 adoption.  Another explanation for this conservative reporting behavior 
is that firms create a “cookie jar” for the financial reporting benefits at the time the 
aggressive tax position was taken.  In other words, at the time the aggressive tax position 
was taken, firms had no need for recognizing the financial reporting benefits; 
consequently, they created a large tax accrual that could be decreased to improve 
earnings in future periods.      
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If a firm did not have a change to UTB at FIN 48 adoption (i.e. ∆UTB equals 
zero), one of two possibilities likely occurred: (1) the firm had an adequate reserve for 
any or all tax positions, or (2) no aggressive tax positions were taken.  Moreover, the 
lack of change to the UTB suggests that firms were adequately reserved in the SFAS 5 
regime for the FIN 48 requirements.  I leave it to future research to explore the reasons 
firms report a positive, negative, or immaterial change to UTB at FIN 48 adoption.  I 
suspect that the determinants of firms’ level of aggressive tax positions may differ when 
firms are divided into three categories based on their change to UTB at FIN 48 adoption 
disclosures.  Consequently, I divide my sample into subsamples based on the change to 
UTB at FIN 48 adoption.  Splitting the sample creates homogenous groups of firms 
based on their past choices for recognizing the financial reporting benefits of aggressive 
tax positions.  Then I analyze the determinants of firms’ aggressive tax positions (UTB), 
permanent aggressive tax positions (PermUTB), and temporary aggressive tax positions 
(TempUTB), while holding firms’ use of managerial discretion over the tax benefits of 
aggressive tax positions constant.  Finally, comparing results across the groups allows 
me to draw conclusions on how firms’ financial reporting aggressiveness is linked to 
firms’ level of aggressive tax positions.  To facilitate comparison between the full 
sample and the sub-groups, the results of Model (1) for UTB and PermUTB from Table 5 
are restated in the first columns of Tables 6 and 7, respectively. 
Results for Total Unrecognized Tax Benefits 
 The results for Model (1) using gross unrecognized tax benefits as the dependent 
variable are reported in Table 6.  Column 1 reports the results for the full sample of 564 
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firms, as reported in Table 5, Column 2.  The model generated with the full sample has 
an adjusted R-squared of 31.61%.  Then I split the full sample into the sub-groups based 
on the change to UTB at FIN 48 adoption (∆TotalUTB).  Table 6, Column 2 reports the 
results for the 168 firms reporting no change to total UTB at FIN 48 adoption 
(∆TotalUTB = 0).  I do not include ∆TotalUTB in the model because it is zero for all 
firms.  Compared to the full sample, the 18.87% adjusted R-squared of this model is a 
dramatic decrease.  The results suggest that for firms adequately reserved for aggressive 
tax positions, UTB is positively associated with Size (ρ ≤ 0.05), SG&A (ρ ≤ 0.10), and 
StrongGScore (ρ ≤ 0.10).  This suggests that firms that are larger, spend more on selling, 
general, and administrative expenses, or have strong shareholder rights engage in taking 
more aggressive tax positions. 
Table 6, Column 4 reports the results for the 281 firms that increased total UTB 
at FIN 48 adoption (∆TotalUTB is positive).  Although all the firms in this group 
increased total UTB at FIN 48 adoption, I include ∆TotalUTB in the model to control for 
the magnitude of the change to UTB at FIN 48 adoption.  The model’s adjusted R-
squared is 39.29%.   The results suggest that when firms aggressively recognized the 
benefits for aggressive tax positions, UTB is positively associated with ∆TotalUTB (ρ ≤ 
0.01), ForeignDum (ρ ≤ 0.05), MTB (ρ ≤ 0.01), TaxShetlerDum (ρ ≤ 0.01), 
LCEM_Record (ρ ≤ 0.05), and BookETR5 (ρ ≤ 0.05), and TaxFeeRatio (ρ ≤ 0.10), and 
UTB is negatively associated with Sales_GR (ρ ≤ 0.01).   
Table 6, Column 5 reports the results for the 115 firms that decreased total UTB 
at FIN 48 adoption (∆TotalUTB is negative).  The results suggest that when firms were 
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conservatively recognizing or “cookie jarring” the benefits for aggressive tax positions, 
UTB is not significantly related to any of the independent variables.  Also, the model has 
a significantly lower adjusted R-squared of 20.07%.    
Comparing the results across the three sub-groups, a couple of inferences can be 
drawn.  Firms that are aggressive in reporting the tax benefits of aggressive tax positions 
are also tax aggressive.  Firms that aggressively recognize the benefits of aggressive tax 
positions (i.e. firms where ∆TotalUTB is positive), also show that the level of UTB is 
associated with tax aggression, as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficients 
on both TaxFeeRatio and TaxShelterDum; in contrast, these variables are not 
significantly associated with the level of UTB for firms that do not aggressively 
recognize the benefits of aggressive tax positions (i.e. firms where ∆TotalUTB is 
negative or zero).  Also the level of UTB is positively and significantly associated with 
measures of overall firms’ financial reporting aggressiveness, for firms that are 
aggressive in reporting the tax benefits of aggressive tax positions (i.e. firms where 
∆TotalUTB is positive), but not for firms that do not report tax benefits aggressively (i.e. 
firms where ∆TotalUTB is negative or zero).  This validates the partitions based on the 
∆TotalUTB.     
Results for Permanent Unrecognized Tax Benefits 
The results for Model (1) using the permanent portion of unrecognized tax 
benefits (PermUTB) as the dependent variable are reported in Table 7.  Column 1 reports 
the results for the full sample of 564 firms, as reported in Table 5, Column 4.  Recall that 
firms that are larger, more profitable, have foreign operations, spend more on research 
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and development activities, spend more on selling, general, and administrative 
expenditures, have higher firm value, are classified as a tax sheltering firm, have a 
record of using last chance earnings management, pay more fees to auditors for tax 
services, and experience less analyst’ coverage have more permanent aggressive tax 
positions.  The model generated with the full sample has an adjusted R-squared of 
32.76%.     
Then I split the full sample into the sub-groups based on the change to UTB at 
FIN 48 adoption that affected retained earnings (∆PermUTB).  Table 7, Column 2 
reports the results for the 172 firms reporting no change to the permanent portion of 
UTB at FIN 48 adoption (∆PermUTB = 0).  I do not include ∆PermUTB in the model 
because it is zero for all firms.  Compared to the full sample, the 20.87% adjusted R-
squared of this model is a dramatic decrease.  The results suggest that for firms 
adequately reserved for permanent aggressive tax positions, PermUTB is positively 
associated with Size (ρ ≤ 0.05), SG&A (ρ ≤ 0.10), MTB (ρ ≤ 0.05), and StrongGScore (ρ 
≤ 0.10).  This suggests that firms that are larger, more profitable, spend more on selling, 
general, and administrative expenses, have higher firm value, or have strong shareholder 
rights engage in taking more permanent aggressive tax positions.   
Table 7, Column 4 reports the results for the 283 firms that increased permanent 
UTB at FIN 48 adoption (∆PermUTB is positive).  Although all the firms in this group 
had an increase to UTB that affected retained earnings at FIN 48 adoption, I include 
∆PermUTB in the model to control for the magnitude of the change to UTB that affects 
retained earnings at FIN 48 adoption.  The results suggest that when firms were 
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aggressively recognizing the benefits for permanent aggressive tax positions, PermUTB 
is positively associated with ∆PermUTB (ρ ≤ 0.01), PT_ROA (ρ ≤ 0.10), ForeignDum (ρ 
≤ 0.05), R&DexpRatio (ρ ≤ 0.01), MTB (ρ ≤ 0.05), TaxShetlerDum (ρ ≤ 0.05), 
LCEM_Record (ρ ≤ 0.01), and BookETR5 (ρ ≤ 0.05), and PermUTB is negatively 
associated with Sales_GR (ρ ≤ 0.01).  The model’s adjusted R-squared is 43.68%.      
Table 7, Column 5 reports the results of for the 109 firms that increased 
permanent UTB at FIN 48 adoption (∆PermUTB is negative).  The results suggest that 
when firms were conservatively recognizing or “cookie jarring” the benefits for 
aggressive tax positions, PermUTB is positively associated with R&DexpRatio (ρ ≤ 
0.10) and MB_Record (ρ ≤ 0.10), but the associations are only marginally significant.  
The adjusted R-squared for the model has dropped to 18.86%.     
Comparing the results across the three sub-groups, a couple of inferences can be 
drawn.  Firms that are aggressive in reporting the tax benefits of permanent aggressive 
tax positions are also tax aggressive.  Firms that aggressively recognize the benefits of 
permanent aggressive tax positions (i.e. firms where ∆PermUTB is positive), also show 
that the level of PermUTB is associated with tax aggression, as evidenced by the positive 
and significant coefficients on TaxShelterDum; in contrast, this variable is not 
significantly associated with the level of PermUTB for firms that do not aggressively 
recognize the benefits of permanent aggressive tax positions (i.e. firms where 
∆PermUTB is negative or zero).  Also the level of PermUTB is positively and 
significantly associated with measures of firms’ overall financial reporting 
aggressiveness for firms that are aggressive in reporting the tax benefits of aggressive 
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tax positions (i.e. firms where ∆PermUTB is positive), but not for firms that do not 
report tax benefits aggressively (i.e. firms where ∆PermUTB is negative or zero).  This 
validates partitioning the sample by ∆PermUTB.     
Results for Temporary Unrecognized Tax Benefits 
I do not report the results for regressing (TempUTB) on Model (1), after splitting 
the sample into sub-groups based on ∆TempUTB.   Almost 80% of the firms have a 
∆TempUTB that equals zero.  This causes the other models (when ∆TempUTB is positive 
or negative) to be over-specified by the inclusion of industry fixed effects.  
Consequently, I do not report these results.     
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Prior to FIN 48 implementation, financial statement users were unable to 
distinguish firms with aggressive tax positions from those with certain tax positions 
because aggressive tax positions were both scantily and inconsistently disclosed 
(Gleason and Mills 2002, 2007; Lisowsky 2008).  Consequently, tax researchers have 
devised numerous measures to proxy for firms’ degree of tax aggressiveness including 
cash effective tax rates (Dyreng et al. 2008) and total book-tax differences (Wilson 
2009).  Although researchers are able to separate the effects of tax avoidance into 
permanent and temporary tax positions, they are unable to isolate the uncertainty 
associated with the tax positions.   
The implementation of FIN 48 creates two manager-assessed measures of 
aggressive tax positions: (1) the total amount reserved for unrecognized tax benefits 
(UTB), which includes both permanent and temporary aggressive tax positions, and (2) 
the amount reserved for permanent, unrecognized tax benefits (PermUTB), which is the 
total amount of UTB that, if recognized, would influence the effective tax rate.  For most 
firms, the FIN 48 adoption disclosure is the first disclosure of aggressive tax positions 
(Zion and Varshney 2007; Blouin and Tuna 2007).   Using the FIN 48 disclosures about 
unrecognized tax benefits to proxy for firms’ level of aggressive tax positions, I 
investigate how firms’ level of aggressive tax positions is influenced by financial 
reporting aggressiveness, choice of auditor, analyst coverage, and corporate governance, 
controlling for firms’ incentives and abilities to engage in aggressive tax positions and 
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firms’ discretion over reporting the financial benefits of aggressive tax positions.  To 
date, lack of disclosure on aggressive tax positions has prevented researchers from 
directly examining these relationships. 
Using 564 calendar year-end industrial firms in the S&P 1500, results suggests 
that  firms’ UTBs are positively associated with proxies for firms’ incentives and 
abilities to engage in aggressive tax positions: firm size, presence of foreign operations, 
research and development activity, selling, general, and administrative expenditures, 
firm value, and the probability that the firm engages in tax shelter activity.  The results 
for permanent unrecognized tax benefits (PermUTB) are largely consistent with those of 
UTB; however, firms’ temporary unrecognized tax benefits are only increasing in firm 
size.   
   I also find that unrecognized tax benefits and their permanent and temporary 
components are positively associated with financial reporting aggressiveness.  These 
findings support the extant literature’s finding that firms’ tax aggressiveness may be 
influenced by their financial reporting aggressiveness (Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Frank et al. 
2009; Lisowsky 2008).  Results also suggest that firms’ use of auditor provided tax 
services have more total and permanent unrecognized tax benefits, but not temporary 
unrecognized tax benefits.  I also document that unrecognized tax benefits and the 
permanent unrecognized tax benefits are negatively related to the number of analysts’ 
covering a firm; however, temporary unrecognized tax benefits are not related to analyst 
coverage.   
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 This study extends the accounting literature in four areas.  First I extend the tax 
avoidance literature by using a more specific measure of firm tax aggression that directly 
captures managers’ “best guess” of outcomes of aggressive tax positions taken by the 
firm.  Second I extend the emerging FIN 48 literature that investigates determinants of 
firms’ aggressive tax positions. Distinct from other FIN 48 studies my large hand-
collected sample is gathered from the S&P 1500, which increases the generalizability of 
my results.  Extant literature suggests that a wide variety of non-tax factors influence 
firms’ tax-related decisions (Frank et al. 2009; Lisowsky 2008); however, the current 
FIN 48 studies focus on how unrecognized tax benefits are influenced by firms’ tax-
related objectives (Song and Tucker 2008; Cazier et al. 2009).  Consistent with the 
notion that tax aggressiveness is associated with tax and non-tax factors, my results 
suggest that financial reporting pressures, analyst coverage, and choice of auditor are 
significantly associated with firms’ level of aggressive tax positions.       
Third, I contribute to the literature examining the relationship between firms’ 
financial reporting aggressiveness and tax aggressiveness.  My study is the first to 
document a strong, positive relationship between financial reporting aggressiveness and 
level of firms’ level of aggressive tax positions.  This result is consistent with the 
findings of Lisowsky (2008) and Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009), but extends their work 
by refining the tax avoidance measure to include only aggressive tax positions.   
Fourth, I extend the literature investigating the influence of analyst coverage and 
corporate governance on tax aggressiveness.  I document a negative association between 
greater analyst coverage and level of permanent aggressive tax positions, suggesting that 
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external monitors focus only on the aggressive tax positions that affect earnings, as 
opposed to aggressive tax positions that do not affect earnings.  I also document that 
corporate governance quality is not a significant factor in determining firms’ level of 
aggressive tax positions.    
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FIGURE 1 
Evolution of Tax Avoidance Measures  
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Panel A: Venn diagram of 700 hand collected firms by type of unrecognized tax positions taken
200 Firms
with Only
Permanent UTBs
28% 62% 2%
*Percenatges in diagram are based on 700 firms
53 Firms
with No UTBs
8%
Panel B: Venn diagram of 564 firms in final sample by type of unrecognized tax positions taken
162 Firms
with Only
Permanent UTBs
29% 63% 2%
*Percenatges in diagram are based on 564 firms
36 Firms
with No UTBs
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Temporary UTBs
Temporary UTBs
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TABLE 1 
Variable Definitions 
 
(Compustat acronyms are capitalized, non-italic variables in parentheses) 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Variable Name Definition 
 
Unrecognized Tax Benefit  = UTB or PermUTB or TempUTB  
 
UTB  = the gross amount of UTB disclosed at FIN 48 adoption, January 1, 2007, 
scaled by lagged total assets (AT). UTB is hand collected from fiscal 2007 first 
quarter 10Q.   
 
PermUTB = the gross amount of UTB disclosed at FIN 48 adoption that affects the firms’ 
ETR, if recognized, scaled by lagged total assets (AT).  PermUTB is hand 
collected from fiscal 2007 first quarter 10Q.  Following Frischmann et al. 
(2008), if PermUTB is not disclosed, I assume that PermUTB equals gross 
UTB.   
 
TempUTB = Temporary Unrecognized Tax Benefits (TempUTB) are calculated as the 
gross amount of UTB less PermUTB disclosed at FIN 48 adoption, scaled by 
lagged total assets (AT). The Temporary UTB is the amount of disclosed UTB 
that will not affect firms’ ETR, if recognized (Frischmann et al. 2008).     
 
Independent Variables, in alphabetical order: 
 
Variable Name Definition 
 
∆UTB = ∆TotalUTB or ∆PermUTB or ∆TempUTB 
 
∆TotalUTB = the total change to UTB disclosed at FIN 48 adoption, scaled by lagged total 
assets (AT).  This variable is hand collected from fiscal 2007 first quarter 10Q.   
 
∆PermUTB = the change to UTB that affects retained earnings disclosed at FIN 48 adoption 
(also called the “cumulative effect adjustment”), scaled by lagged total assets 
(AT).  This variable is hand collected from fiscal 2007 first quarter 10Q. 
 
∆TempUTB = the difference between the total change to UTB and the change to UTB that 
affects stock holders’ equity or retained earnings disclosed at FIN 48 adoption, 
scaled by lagged total assets (AT).   
 
Bd_Indep%   =% of board members considered independent during the 2006 fiscal year.  
Collected using Risk Metrics data or Corporate Library data (if available); 
otherwise, hand collected using 10-K Wizard. 
 
BookETR5  = Sum of Tax Expense (TXT) over past 5 years divided by sum of Pre-tax 
Income (PI) less Special Items (SPI) over past 5 years (2002 through 2006).  I 
require firms to have at least 3 years of data.  Following Dyreng et al. (2008), I 
require the sum of pre-tax income less special items to be greater than 0.  Also, 
if Special Items (SPI) is missing, I set SPI equal to 0.   
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
CashETR5 = Sum of Cash Tax Paid (TXPD) over past 5 years divided by sum of Pre-tax 
Income (PI) less Special Items (SPI) over past 5 years.  I require firms to have 
at least 3 years of data.  Following Dyreng et al. (2008), I require the sum of 
pre-tax income less special items to be greater than 0.  Also, if Special Items 
(SPI) is missing, I set SPI equal to 0.   
 
 
DA = 5 year sum of pre-tax discretionary accruals calculated using performance-
adjusted modified Jones’ model.  First, I delete all firms in the Compustat 
universe with assets less than one million, then I run the following cross-
sectional regression by 2-digit SIC industry and year.  
   
 TACCit = α0 1/ATit + α1 SSAit+ α2 PPENTit+ α3 ROAit + ε it  
  
TACCit  = Total Accruals using the cash flow approach calculated as 
((IBC+TXT) – ((OANCF +TXPD) – XIDOC)), scaled by lagged total assets 
(AT). 
 
 SSA = Change is sales (SALE less lagged SALE) minus change in accounts 
receivable (RECCH), scaled by lagged total assets (AT). 
 
 PPENT = Total net value of property, plant, and equipment (PPENT), scaled by 
lagged total assets (AT). 
 
 PT_ROA = Pre-tax return on assets calculated as pre-tax income (PI), scaled by 
lagged total assets (AT).  
 
 The, I use the estimated coefficients from the TACC regression above to 
calculate the expected accrual. The discretionary accrual is the actual accrual 
less the expected accrual.  Finally, I sum the PAMJ discretionary accruals over 
2002 through 2006. 
 
 
ForeignDum = 1 if the sum of foreign pretax income (PIFO) for 2002-2006 is positive, 0 
otherwise.  Specification follows Rego (2003).   
 
Ind_Specialist  = 1 if audit firm had the highest audit market share in the industry (two-digit 
SIC) during 2006 and if its market share was at least ten percentage points 
higher than the nearest competitor in that industry (Mayhew and Wilkins 2003). 
 
IO%  = Institutional Ownership % is the ratio of shares held by institutional owners 
to the number of shares outstanding (CSHO) at the end of fiscal 2006. 
 
LCEM  = Last Chance Earnings Management (LCEM) 1 when both the following are 
met: 1) firms Meet/Beat analysts’ annual forecast for year (Meet/Beat=1) and 
2) the I/B/E/S consensus forecast estimate less earnings absent tax expense 
management [pre-tax income (PI) * (1-ETRq3) divided by common shares to 
compute basic EPS (CHSPRI)], where ETRq3 is defined as year-to-date tax 
expense (TXTQ) divided by accumulated pre-tax income (PIQ). 
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TABLE1 (continued) 
 
LCEMRecord_MB  = Ratio of number of years that a firm used last chance earnings management 
divided by number of years that firm meet/beat analysts’ annual forecast, over 
2002-2006.  I require a firm to have at least 3 years of analysts’ forecast data 
and 3 years of LCEM data to remain in the sample. 
 
Leverage = Long term debt (DLTT) + total debt in current liabilities (DLC), scaled by 
lagged total assets (AT).  If (DLTT) or (DLC) is missing, then I replace them 
with 0. (Follows Cazier et al. (2009)).   
 
LisowskyCM2 = Likelihood of a firm engaging in a tax shelter, from Lisowsky (2010), Table 
4, Combined Model 2.    
 
MB_Record  = Ratio of the number of annual earnings announcements that meet/beat 
analysts’ annual earnings forecasts over total number of years firm followed by 
analysts during fiscal years 2002 through 2006.  I require a firm to have at least 
3 years of analysts’ forecast data to remain in the sample. 
 
Meet/Beat  = 1 when a firm’s annual earnings meet/beat the analysts’ annual earnings 
forecasts; 0 otherwise. 
MTB = Market to book ratio calculated as common shares outstanding (CSHO) times 
price closed at annual fiscal year-end (PRCC_F), scaled by total common 
equity (CEQ).  (Follows Cazier et al. (2009)).  .     
 
Number Analysts  = Number of analysts covering the firm reported by I/B/E/S at fiscal 2006 year-
end. 
 
Num_An  = Number of analysts covering the firm reported by I/B/E/S at fiscal 2006 year-
end, scaled by lagged total assets (AT). 
 
PT_ROA = Pretax income (PI), scaled by lagged total assets (AT).   
 
R&DexpRatio = Ratio of sum R&D expense to sum Net Sales, where I sum R&D expense 
(XRD) and net sales (SALE) over the years 2002-2006.  (Follows Gleason and 
Mills (2007) and Song and Tucker (2008)).   
 
Sales_GR = Three-year average change in sales (SALE).  (Follows Song and Tucker 
(2008) and Cazier et al. (2009)).   
 
SG&A = Selling General and Administrative Expense (XSGA), scaled by lagged total 
assets (AT). If (XSGA) is missing, then I set (XSGA) = 0.  (Follows Cazier et 
al. (2009)).  .     
 
Size = the natural log of total assets (AT). 
 
StrongGscore = 1 if Governance Index of the firm is less than or equal to the sample mean 
Governance Index (9); otherwise 0.  Where the Governance Index is the 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick governance score collected from RiskMetrics 
(follows Rego and Wilson (2008)). 
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TABLE1 (continued) 
 
TaxFeeRatio =Ratio of tax fees paid to auditors divided by total fees paid to auditors.  
Collected from tax fee data through Audit Analytics; otherwise, hand collected 
using 10-K Wizard to search DEF 14A disclosures. 
 
TaxShelterDum = 1 when Wilson is greater than the median value; otherwise, 0. 
 
Wilson = Likelihood of a firm engaging in a tax shelter, from Wilson (2009), Table 5, 
column 3.   
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Panel A: Sample Selection
Determination of Sample for Hand Collection All Large Mid Small
S&P 1500 as of 12/29/2006 1500 500 400 600
Companies not on Compustat Annual 26 8 6 12
Companies with year end other than Dec 451 130 120 201
Companies classified as REITs (SIC 6798) 39 11 13 15
Companies classified Financials (SIC 60-69) 187 75 44 68
Companies classified Utilities (SIC 49) 79 36 28 15
No 10-Q1 2007 Available 18 3 2 13
Final Sample for Hand Collection 700 237 187 276
Breakdown of Hand collected sample
Firms with immaterial UTB or UTB= 0 53 5 17 31
Firms with UTB disclosed at FIN 48 Adoption 647 232 170 245
Firms missing data for explantory variables 136 34 32 70
Final Sample for UTB Regressions 564 203 155 206
Breakdown of UTB Sample
Firms with immaterial UTB or UTB= 0 36 5 12 19
Firms with UTB disclosed at FIN 48 Adoption 528 198 143 187
Firm Size Breakdown for Firms with Perment UTBs 517 193 140 184
Firm Size Breakdown for Firms with Temporary UTBs 366 163 102 101
TABLE 2
Sample Selection and Industry Breakdown by 2-digit SIC
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Panel B: Industry breakdown of S&P 1500 as of 12/31/2006 and Final Sample
SIC2
S&P 
1500 
All 
Firms
S&P 
1500 Non 
Year End 
Firms
S&P 
1500 
Year End 
Firms
Final 
Sample 
Year End 
Firms
%  of Final 
Sample SIC2 Description
1 1 1 0 Agricultural Production - Crops
7 1 0 1 Agricultural Services
10 3 0 3 2 0.35 Metal Mining
12 4 0 4 3 0.53 Coal Mining
13 41 4 37 31 5.50 Oil and Gas Extraction
14 4 0 4 4 0.71 Mining and Quarrying of Nonmetallic Minerals, Not Fuels
15 14 7 7 7 1.24 Building Cnstrctn - General Contractors & Operative Blders
16 5 2 3 3 0.53 Heavy Cnstrctn, Except Building Construction - Contractors
17 3 0 3 2 0.35 Construction - Special Trade Contractors
20 37 19 18 15 2.66 Food and Kindred Products
21 3 0 3 Tobacco Products
22 4 1 3 3 0.53 Textile Mill Products
23 12 9 3 3 0.53 Apparel, Finished Prdcts from Fabrics & Similar Materials
24 8 1 7 5 0.89 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture
25 11 6 5 5 0.89 Furniture and Fixtures
26 25 2 23 15 2.66 Paper and Allied Products
27 22 7 15 13 2.30 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries
28 98 25 73 58 10.28 Chemicals and Allied Products
29 13 2 11 10 1.77 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries
30 11 1 10 9 1.60 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products
31 8 3 5 4 0.71 Leather and Leather Products
32 6 3 3 2 0.35 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products
33 22 6 16 14 2.48 Primary Metal Industries
34 19 7 12 10 1.77 Fabricated Metal Prdcts, Except Machinery & Transport Eq
35 80 30 50 40 7.09 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Eq
36 116 56 60 42 7.45 Electronic, Elctrcl Eqpmnt & Cmpnts, Excpt Computer Eq
37 37 12 25 20 3.55 Transportation Equipment
38 86 34 52 47 8.33 Mesr/Anlyz/Cntrl Instrmnts; Photo/Med/Opt Gds; Watchs
39 14 6 8 7 1.24 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries
40 5 0 5 5 0.89 Railroad Transportation
42 11 0 11 8 1.42 Motor Freight Transportation
44 6 2 4 4 0.71 Water Transportation
45 9 4 5 5 0.89 Transportation by Air
47 7 0 7 4 0.71 Transportation Services
48 27 1 26 10 1.77 Communications
49 88 9 79 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services
50 35 14 21 13 2.30 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods
51 14 8 6 4 0.71 Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods
52 4 2 2 Building Matrials, Hrdwr, Garden Supply & Mobile Home Dlrs
53 16 15 1 1 0.18 General Merchandise Stores
54 6 5 1 1 0.18 Food Stores
55 10 5 5 5 0.89 Automotive Dealers and Gasoline Service Stations
56 27 27 0 Apparel and Accessory Stores
57 9 6 3 3 0.53 Home Furniture, Furnishings and Equipment Stores
58 24 9 15 13 2.30 Eating and Drinking Places
59 27 15 12 8 1.42 Miscellaneous Retail
TABLE 2 (continued)
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Panel B (continued)
SIC2
S&P 
1500 
All 
Firms
S&P 
1500 Non 
Year End 
Firms
S&P 
1500 
Year End 
Firms
Final 
Sample 
Year End 
Firms
%  of Final 
Sample SIC2 Description
60 92 3 89 Depository Institutions
61 12 3 9 Nondepository Credit Institutions
62 28 11 17 Security & Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges & Srvs
63 60 0 60 Insurance Carriers
64 7 0 7 Insurance Agents, Brokers and Service
65 3 0 3 Real Estate
67 40 0 40 Holding and Other Investment Offices
70 3 0 3 2 0.35 Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and Other Lodging Places
72 5 5 0 Personal Services
73 129 47 82 63 11.17 Business Services
75 4 1 3 2 0.35 Automotive Repair, Services and Parking
78 2 2 0 Motion Pictures
79 8 2 6 3 0.53 Amusement and Recreation Services
80 27 3 24 20 3.55 Health Services
82 8 4 4 4 0.71 Educational Services
83 2 0 2 Social Services
87 22 7 15 10 1.77 Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management
99 4 1 3 2 0.35 Nonclassifiable Establishments
Totals 1489 455 1034 564 100%
REITs are real estate investment trusts.  UTB is unrecognized tax benefits.
TABLE 2 (continued)
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Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Sample Firms
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum
Lower 
Quartile Median
Upper 
Quartile Maximum
FIN 48 Unrecognized Tax Benefit Variables:
UTB 564 0.0147 0.0133 0 0.0048 0.0104 0.0209 0.0501
PermUTB 564 0.0110 0.0113 0 0.0029 0.0072 0.0151 0.0416
TempUTB 564 0.0035 0.0047 0 0 0.0013 0.0052 0.0161
Controls for Firms' Discretion over Recognizing the Tax Benefits of Aggressive Tax Positions
∆TotalUTB 564 0.0017 0.0036 -0.0023 0 0 0.0023 0.0124
∆PermUTB 564 0.0010 0.0025 -0.0023 0 0 0.0015 0.0082
∆TempUTB 564 0.0004 0.0012 -0.0004 0 0 0 0.0050
Controls for Firms' Incentives and Abilities to Engage in Aggressive Tax Positions:
Size 564 7.8053 1.4323 4.4414 6.6859 7.6597 8.7009 13.4549
PT_ROA 564 0.1181 0.0826 -0.0232 0.0644 0.1072 0.1629 0.3104
Leverage 564 0.2225 0.1655 0 0.0791 0.2053 0.3412 0.5634
ForeignDum 564 0.6188 0.4861 0 0 1 1 1
R&DexpRatio 564 0.0356 0.0588 0 0 0.0045 0.0381 0.2025
SG&A 564 0.2341 0.1700 0.0086 0.1022 0.2036 0.3243 0.6294
CashETR5 564 0.2235 0.1094 0.0187 0.1353 0.2359 0.3045 0.4089
MTB 564 3.1307 1.7528 1.2068 1.8451 2.6506 3.7634 7.9963
Sales_GR 564 0.1942 0.1785 -0.0087 0.0682 0.1398 0.2696 0.6869
Controls for Firms' Probability of Engaging in Tax Sheltering:
Wilson 564 0.6606 0.2489 0.0051 0.5096 0.7104 0.8592 0.9969
TaxShelterDum 564 0.5 0.5004 0 0 0.5 1 1
LisowskyCM2 564 0.9712 0.1051 0.0177 0.9869 0.9981 0.9997 1.0000
Financial Reporting Aggressiveness Variables:
DA 564 -0.2949 0.2647 -0.8491 -0.4446 -0.2500 -0.0969 0.0940
MB_Record 564 0.7629 0.2191 0.3333 0.6000 0.8000 1.0000 1.0000
LCEM_Record 564 0.3935 0.3353 0.0000 0.0000 0.3333 0.6000 1.0000
BookETR5 564 0.2832 0.1021 0.0286 0.2306 0.3076 0.3622 0.4290
Choice of Auditor Variables:
Big4Dum 564 0.9521 0.2137 0 1 1 1 1
Ind_Specialist 564 0.1631 0.3698 0 0 0 0 1
TaxAudit06Dum 564 0.8280 0.3777 0 1 1 1 1
TaxFeeRatio 564 0.0862 0.0882 0 0.0104 0.0565 0.1389 0.2871
Analysts' Coverage Variables:
Number Analysts 564 10.9823 6.6228 0 6 10 15 37
Num_An 564 0.0072 0.0078 0.0005 0.0017 0.0040 0.0100 0.0291
Descriptive Statistics
TABLE 3
 
 77 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (continued)
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum
Lower 
Quartile Median
Upper 
Quartile Maximum
Corporate Governance Variables:
BdInd% 564 0.7270 0.1376 0.4545 0.6250 0.7500 0.8516 0.9091
IO% 564 0.8367 0.1289 0.5743 0.7449 0.8497 0.9509 1
StrongGscore 564 0.5745 0.4949 0 0 1 1 1
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of S&P 1500 versus sample firms
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum
Lower 
Quartile Median
Upper 
Quartile Maximum
S&P 1500 Firms
Size 1474 7.9456 1.6730 3.8832 6.7154 7.7475 8.9579 14.4491
PT_ROA 1473 0.1006 0.0839 -0.0273 0.0379 0.0842 0.1523 0.2914
Leverage 1473 0.2241 0.1828 0.0000 0.0608 0.2033 0.3417 0.6220
SG&A 1473 0.2101 0.1914 0.0000 0.0305 0.1707 0.3262 0.6384
MTB 1471 2.9376 1.6591 1.1453 1.7100 2.4542 3.6148 7.4885
Sales_GR 1464 0.1826 0.1702 -0.0358 0.0643 0.1370 0.2635 0.6250
Sample Firms
Size 564 7.8053 1.4323 4.4414 6.6859 7.6597 8.7009 13.4549
PT_ROA 564 0.1181 0.0826 -0.0232 0.0644 0.1072 0.1629 0.3104
Leverage 564 0.2225 0.1655 0.0000 0.0791 0.2053 0.3412 0.5634
SG&A 564 0.2341 0.1700 0.0086 0.1022 0.2036 0.3243 0.6294
MTB 564 3.1307 1.7528 1.2068 1.8451 2.6506 3.7634 7.9963
Sales_GR 564 0.1942 0.1785 -0.0087 0.0682 0.1398 0.2696 0.6869
See Table 2 for complete definition of variables.  
All continuous variables are windsorized at the top and bottom five percent.  
TABLE 3 (Continued)
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Panel A: CorrelationsUnrecognized tax benefits and control variables for firms' discretion over recognizing the benefits of aggressive tax positions 
and firms' incentives and abilities to engage in aggressive tax positions and tax sheltering.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 UTB 0.92 0.53 0.32 0.33 0.05 0.12 0.02 -0.03 0.22 0.33 0.12 -0.02 0.24 -0.02 0.13
2 UTB_ETR 0.90 0.20 0.29 0.34 -0.01 0.10 0.06 -0.07 0.23 0.34 0.14 -0.06 0.26 -0.03 0.11
3 TempUTB 0.52 0.21 0.25 0.16 0.19 0.14 -0.05 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.09
4 ∆TotalUTB 0.22 0.20 0.12 0.79 0.56 -0.16 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.06
5 ∆PermUTB 0.22 0.23 0.10 0.89 0.06 -0.15 0.03 -0.04 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.05
6 ∆TempUTB 0.05 -0.02 0.10 0.40 0.09 -0.05 -0.03 0.10 -0.04 0.10 0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.10 -0.05
7 Size 0.13 0.10 0.21 -0.17 -0.15 -0.08 -0.01 0.27 0.20 -0.09 -0.36 0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.65
8 PT_ROA 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.29 0.04 -0.14 0.05 0.07 0.42 0.33 0.14
9 Leverage 0.00 -0.03 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.32 -0.30 -0.03 -0.17 -0.19 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.09
10 ForeignDum 0.26 0.30 0.11 0.06 0.08 -0.10 0.19 0.06 -0.02 0.08 0.01 -0.03 0.10 -0.06 0.14
11 R&DexpRatio 0.40 0.42 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.17 0.26 0.25 -0.20 0.08 0.09 -0.11
12 SG&A 0.21 0.23 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.06 -0.38 0.05 -0.21 0.05 0.31 0.06 0.18 -0.12 -0.31
13 CashETR5 -0.02 -0.04 0.08 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.21 0.06 -0.02 -0.26 0.02
14 MTB 0.26 0.28 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.47 -0.07 0.11 0.18 0.20 -0.04 0.00 0.06
15 Sales_GR -0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.09 0.08 0.08 -0.06 0.37 -0.08 -0.04 0.06 -0.10 -0.25 0.05 -0.04
16 TaxShelterDum 0.13 0.10 0.15 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0.69 0.14 0.11 0.14 -0.04 -0.31 0.01 0.04 -0.04
TABLE 4 
Pearson/Spearman Correlation Matrix
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Panel B: CorrelationsUnrecognized tax benefits and control variables for firms' discretion over recognizing the benefits of aggressive tax
 positions and variables of interest for financial reporitng aggressiveness, auditor choice, analyst coverage and 
 corporate governance.
1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
2 UTB 0.92 0.53 0.32 0.33 0.05 -0.18 0.11 0.26 -0.09 -0.05 0.15 -0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.06
3 UTB_ETR 0.90 0.20 0.29 0.34 -0.01 -0.21 0.11 0.24 -0.14 -0.07 0.13 -0.03 0.07 -0.06 0.06
4 TempUTB 0.52 0.21 0.25 0.16 0.19 -0.02 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.06 -0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.02
5 ∆TotalUTB 0.22 0.20 0.12 0.79 0.56 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.00 -0.06 0.14 0.00 0.01 -0.03
6 ∆PermUTB 0.22 0.23 0.10 0.89 0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 0.11 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02
7 ∆TempUTB 0.05 -0.02 0.10 0.40 0.09 -0.05 -0.01 0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.00
8 DA -0.19 -0.20 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.11 -0.07 -0.05 0.08 -0.05 -0.20 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05
9 MB_Record 0.15 0.14 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.12 0.01 0.03 -0.08 0.05 0.11 0.05 -0.04 -0.01
10 LCEM_Record 0.25 0.24 0.11 -0.05 -0.04 0.06 -0.07 0.04 -0.28 -0.05 0.06 -0.11 0.09 0.07 -0.03
11 BookETR5 -0.19 -0.22 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.30 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.13 0.06 0.01
12 Ind_Specialist -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.09 -0.09 -0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.13 0.04 -0.10 -0.06
13 TaxFeeRatio 0.16 0.18 0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.00
14 Num_An -0.08 -0.06 -0.15 0.17 0.15 0.10 -0.18 0.06 -0.07 0.10 -0.16 -0.07 -0.07 0.27 0.17
15 BdInd% 0.10 0.12 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 0.06 0.09 -0.16 0.03 0.03 -0.14 0.09 -0.12
16 IO% -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.06 0.08 -0.09 -0.07 0.34 0.06 0.12
StrongGscore 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.04 0.16 -0.12 0.14
Panel A shows Pearson (upper diagonal) and Spearman (bottom diagonal) correlation coefficients for uncertain tax benefits and control variables
Panel B shows Pearson (upper diagonal) and Spearman (bottom diagonal) correlation coefficients for uncertain tax benefits and variables of interest.
See Table 2 for complete definition of variables. 
All continuous variables are windsorized at the top and bottom five percent.    
Bolded correlations are significant at the 0.05 level.
TABLE 4 (continued)
80 
 
 
80 
Intercept ? -0.0146 ### -0.0188 ### -0.0128 ### -0.0129 # -0.0030 -0.0061 ##
(-2.86) (-2.28) (-2.89) (-1.92) (-1.55) (-2.02)
∆UTB ? 1.0887 ### 1.1300 ### 1.4965 ### 1.5279 ### 0.65447 ### 0.65589 ###
(6.37) (6.69) (7.50) (7.70) (3.34) (3.42)
Size + 0.0016 *** 0.0012 ** 0.0014 *** 0.0008 * 0.0005 ** 0.0005 **
(3.17) (2.04) (2.96) (1.59) (2.04) (2.01)
PT_ROA + -0.0006 0.0059 0.0055 0.0125 * -0.0023 -0.0031
(-0.07) (0.60) (0.69) (1.47) (-0.65) (-0.78)
Leverage ? 0.0000 -0.0021 0.0001 -0.0014 0.0012 0.0009
(0.01) (-0.54) (0.02) (-0.44) (0.83) (0.66)
ForeignDum + 0.0024 ** 0.0025 ** 0.0024 ** 0.0025 ** -0.0001 0.0000
(1.89) (1.90) (2.28) (2.27) (-0.24) (-0.06)
R&DexpRatio + 0.0420 *** 0.0338 *** 0.0453 *** 0.0400 *** -0.0007 -0.0038
(3.19) (2.43) (4.09) (3.34) (-0.15) (-0.74)
SG&A + 0.0062 ** 0.0068 ** 0.0047 * 0.005 * 0.0015 0.00143
(1.70) (1.82) (1.52) (1.57) (1.02) (0.94)
CashETR5 - 0.0036 0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0014 0.0047 0.0032
(0.64) (0.47) (-0.62) (-0.27) (2.22) (1.45)
MTB + 0.0013 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0009 *** 0.0001 0.0001
(3.68) (3.07) (3.66) (2.92) (0.68) (0.57)
Sales_GR - -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0024 -0.0019 0.0015 0.0011
(-0.033) (-0.15) (-0.76) (-0.60) (1.11) (0.79)
TaxShelterDum + 0.0035 *** 0.0032 ** 0.0023 ** 0.0021 ** 0.0008 * 0.0008
(2.38) (2.23) (1.84) (1.73) (1.33) (1.22)
DA + -0.0009 -0.0021 0.0001
(-0.35) (-0.92) (0.13)
MB_Record + -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002
(-0.04) (0.05) (-0.23)
LCEM_Record + 0.0055 *** 0.0045 *** 0.0013 **
(3.27) (3.19) (1.86)
BookETR5 + 0.0032 -0.0031 0.0051 **
(0.46) (-0.52) (2.08)
Ind_Specialist ? -0.0013 -0.0016 0.0004
(-0.89) (-1.34) (0.57)
TaxFeeRatio + 0.0121 ** 0.0083 * 0.0013
(1.93) (1.55) (0.54)
Num_An - -0.1486 * -0.1771 ** 0.0330
(-1.44) (-2.03) (0.83)
BdInd% ? -0.0004 0.0000 0.0005
(-0.11) (0.00) (0.31)
IO% ? 0.0037 0.0021 0.0003
(0.87) (0.61) (0.15)
StrongGscore ? 0.00178 # 0.0011 0.0004
(1.89) (1.38) (1.00)
Number of Obs. 564 564 564 564 564 564
Adj R-Sq 29.63% 31.61% 30.69% 32.76% 8.92% 8.85%
TABLE 5
Coefficients and t-Statistics for OLS Regression Results of Model 1
Column 6
Dependent Variable:
UTB PermUTB TempUTB
Column 5Expectation Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
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***, **, and * indicate p-values less than 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively, one tailed.  
###, ##, and # indicate p-values less than 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively, two tailed.
t-Statistics with White's heteroskedasticity-corrected standard error are reported in parentheses.  
Fixed effects for 2-digit SIC codes are included in the regressions; however, they are not tabulated.
See Table 2 for complete definition of variables. 
All continuous variables are windsorized at the top and bottom five percent.   
TABLE 5 (continued)
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Dependent Variable: UTB
Intercept ? -0.0188 ### -0.0300 -0.0137 -0.0241 ## -0.0070
(-2.28) (-1.64) (-1.43) (-2.18) (-0.25)
∆TotalUTB ? 1.1300 ### 1.0596 ### 1.4616 ### -2.308
(6.69) (5.92) (7.51) (-1.32)
Size + 0.0012 ** 0.0024 ** 0.0008 0.00042 0.0020
(2.04) (1.88) (1.07) (0.51) (1.11)
PT_ROA + 0.0059 0.00062 0.0081 0.00719 -0.0285
(0.60) (0.03) (0.61) (0.52) (-0.50)
Leverage ? -0.0021 -0.0067 -0.0026 -0.0036 -0.0021
(-0.54) (-1.04) (-0.50) (-0.63) (-0.16)
ForeignDum + 0.0025 ** 0.00261 0.0030 ** 0.00378 ** 0.0003
(1.90) (0.83) (1.79) (1.94) (0.08)
R&DexpRatio + 0.0338 *** 0.02042 0.0395 ** 0.01922 0.0327
(2.43) (0.76) (2.27) (0.91) (0.69)
SG&A + 0.0068 ** 0.01261 * 0.0027 0.00552 -0.0033
(1.82) (1.33) (0.56) (0.92) (-0.30)
CashETR5 - 0.0029 0.00786 -0.0005 0.00417 0.0036
(0.47) (0.63) (-0.06) (0.45) (0.17)
MTB + 0.0011 *** 0.00121 0.0013 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0017
(3.07) (1.18) (2.87) (2.36) (1.21)
Sales_GR - -0.0006 0.01461 -0.0082 ** -0.0096 *** -0.0083
(-0.15) (1.67) (-1.99) (-2.59) (-0.61)
TaxShelterDum + 0.0032 ** 0.0020 0.00254 * 0.00509 *** -0.0054
(2.23) (0.82) (1.29) (2.38) (-0.96)
DA + -0.0009 0.0000 -0.001 -0.0033 0.001
(-0.35) (0.00) (-0.44) (-0.97) (0.11)
MB_Record + -0.0001 -0.0022 0.0008 0.0010 0.0091
(-0.04) (-0.37) (0.27) (0.30) (1.34)
LCEM_Record + 0.0055 *** 0.0054 0.006 *** 0.0058 ** 0.002
(3.27) (1.26) (2.90) (2.27) (0.38)
BookETR5 + 0.0032 -0.0162 0.0137 ** 0.0149 ** 0.0080
(0.46) (-1.15) (1.56) (1.69) (0.42)
Ind_Specialist ? -0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0009 0.0030
(-0.89) (-0.14) (-0.26) (-0.44) (0.73)
TaxFeeRatio + 0.0121 ** 0.0025 0.0082 0.0128 * 0.0015
(1.93) (0.17) (1.11) (1.62) (0.08)
Num_An - -0.1486 * -0.0670 -0.1667 * -0.0785 0.0694
(-1.44) (-0.31) (-1.35) (-0.57) (0.17)
BdInd% ? -0.0004 -0.0076 0.0008 0.0005 0.0049
(-0.11) (-0.82) (0.17) (0.09) (0.34)
IO% ? 0.0037 0.0081 0.0056 0.0087 -0.0098
(0.87) (0.90) (1.09) (1.44) (-0.62)
StrongGscore ? 0.0018 # 0.00367 # 0.0010 0.00061 0.0026
(1.89) (1.82) (0.81) (0.44) (0.88)
Number of Obs. 564 168 396 281 115
Adj R-Sq 31.61% 18.87% 29.36% 39.29% 20.07%
TABLE 6
Coefficients and t-Statistics for OLS Regression Results of Model 1,
when sample is separated by the type of ΔUTB at FIN 48 adoption
Expectation Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
∆UTB  variable used: ∆TotalUTB
Column 5
∆UTB = 0Full Sample Pos. ∆UTB∆UTB ≠ 0 Neg. ∆UTB
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***, **, and * indicate p-values less than 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively, one tailed.  
###, ##, and # indicate p-values less than 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively, two tailed.
t-Statistics with White's heteroskedasticity-corrected standard error are reported in parentheses.  
Fixed effects for 2-digit SIC codes are included in the regressions; however, they are not tabulated.
See Table 2 for complete definition of variables. 
All continuous variables are windsorized at the top and bottom five percent.    
TABLE 6 (continued)
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Dependent Variable: PermUTB
Intercept ? -0.0129 # -0.0204 -0.0086 -0.0221 ### 0.0105
(-1.92) (-1.37) (-1.06) (-2.67) (0.46)
∆PermUTB ? 1.5279 ### 1.4961 ### 2.1264 ### -2.0405
(7.70) (7.23) (9.24) (-1.03)
Size + 0.0008 * 0.0018 ** 0.0004 0.00052 0.0011
(1.59) (1.66) (0.58) (0.76) (0.65)
PT_ROA + 0.0125 * 0.00299 0.0154 0.01509 * -0.0267
(1.47) (0.17) (1.37) (1.31) (-0.57)
Leverage ? -0.0014 -0.007 -0.0007 0.00188 -0.0138
(-0.44) (-1.48) (-0.15) (0.38) (-1.27)
ForeignDum + 0.0025 ** 0.0023 0.0030 ** 0.00296 ** 0.0038
(2.27) (0.88) (2.12) (1.96) (1.14)
R&DexpRatio + 0.0400 *** 0.02665 0.0451 *** 0.03015 ** 0.0562 *
(3.34) (1.10) (3.17) (1.74) (1.54)
SG&A + 0.0050 * 0.01236 * 0.0015 0.00567 -0.0106
(1.57) (1.55) (0.37) (1.17) (-1.04)
CashETR5 - -0.0014 0.00124 -0.0035 -0.0061 0.0035
(-0.27) (0.12) (-0.48) (-0.84) (0.18)
MTB + 0.0009 *** 0.00147 ** 0.0010 *** 0.0009 ** 0.0009
(2.92) (1.77) (2.58) (2.09) (0.84)
Sales_GR - -0.0019 0.0104 -0.0083 *** -0.0095 *** -0.0089
(-0.60) (1.50) (-2.41) (-2.98) (-0.70)
TaxShelterDum + 0.0021 ** 0.0023 0.0017 0.00309 ** -0.005
(1.73) (1.11) (1.03) (1.74) (-1.17)
DA + -0.0021 0.0020 -0.003 -0.0026 -0.007
(-0.92) (0.37) (-1.14) (-0.87) (-0.97)
MB_Record + 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.0072 *
(0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.23) (1.34)
LCEM_Record + 0.0045 *** 0.0050 0.004 *** 0.0050 *** 0.001
(3.19) (1.39) (2.41) (2.34) (0.17)
BookETR5 + -0.0031 -0.0201 0.0055 0.0152 ** -0.0033
(-0.52) (-1.81) (0.70) (2.23) (-0.19)
Ind_Specialist ? -0.0016 -0.0004 -0.0016 -0.0012 0.0010
(-1.34) (-0.18) (-1.04) (-0.72) (0.27)
TaxFeeRatio + 0.0083 * 0.0067 0.0058 0.0085 0.0130
(1.55) (0.56) (0.90) (1.23) (0.88)
Num_An - -0.1771 ** -0.1134 -0.2215 ** -0.0856 0.0847
(-2.03) (-0.62) (-2.09) (-0.75) (0.22)
BdInd% ? 0.0000 -0.0061 0.0011 0.0000 -0.0065
(0.00) (-0.80) (0.26) (0.00) (-0.53)
IO% ? 0.0021 0.0054 0.0024 0.0077 -0.0170
(0.61) (0.72) (0.58) (1.57) (-1.42)
StrongGscore ? 0.0011 0.0029 # 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0019
(1.38) (1.71) (0.36) (-0.10) (0.72)
Number of Obs. 564 172 392 283 109
Adj R-Sq 32.76% 20.87% 30.87% 43.68% 18.86%
TABLE 7
Coefficients and t-Statistics OLS Regression Results of Model 1,
when sample is separated by the type of ΔUTB at FIN 48 adoption
Column 5Column 1 Column 4Expectation
∆UTB  variable used: ∆PermUTB
Column 2 Column 3
Full Sample ∆UTB = 0 ∆UTB ≠ 0 Pos. ∆UTB Neg. ∆UTB
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***, **, and * indicate p-values less than 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively, one tailed.  
###, ##, and # indicate p-values less than 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively, two tailed.
t-Statistics with White's heteroskedasticity-corrected standard error are reported in parentheses.  
Fixed effects for 2-digit SIC codes are included in the regressions; however, they are not tabulated.
See Table 2 for complete definition of variables. 
All continuous variables are windsorized at the top and bottom five percent.    
TABLE 7 (continued)
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